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C O N C LU SIO N ................................................................................................. 10 15
INTRODUCTION

The transition between presidencies has long created controversies.
Whether the issue is "midnight judges" or "midnight regulations," presidential
action at the end of a term has long provoked scrutiny and criticism.
Presidents have also raised eyebrows at the beginning of their terms by
asserting their authority in an attempt to undo what their predecessor in office
left behind. More than one president has taken action aimed specifically at
"midnight regulations," such as ordering a freeze on the issuance of new
regulations, a review of regulations issued at the end of the prior
administration, or other similar action.
Although the old President formally retains all the powers of the presidency
until the new President is inaugurated, an increased pace of regulatory action
late in the term may appear unseemly. In fact, one might expect that once an
election has taken place and a new President has been elected, especially if that
President is of a different party, the incumbent President should not order
significant regulatory actions that the new President or his newly appointed
officials are likely to oppose. The new administration should not be forced to
spend its first several months in office digging out from under a large pile of
activity that occurred immediately before the transition.
The longstanding controversy over presidential power in transitions was
reignited by the transition between the administrations of Presidents William
Clinton and George W. Bush. Besides charges of vandalism to and theft of
government property, such as the removal of the letter "W" from governmentowned keyboards,' there were more serious charges that President Clinton and
his administration took actions in the waning days of his presidency in an
effort to extend his influence beyond the limits of his term. In its last three
months, the Clinton administration published more than 26,000 pages in the
Federal Register, beating the previous record of more than 24,000 pages held
by the departing Carter administration in 1980-1981.2 Although the Clinton
Immediately after President George W. Bush took office, there were reports of
extensive vandalism to executive branch offices, including the removal of the "W" key from
some computer keyboards. See Aides Cite Some Vandalism, AP ONLINE, Jan. 26, 2001.

These claims were denied by Clinton administration employees, and although the claim
stayed alive for some time, no more than a few isolated incidents were substantiated, with
the exception of minor pranks that reportedly are traditional when the new President is of
the other party.

See Judy Keen, Ex-Clinton Staffers on Vandalism, Got Proof?, USA

TODAY, June 4, 2001,
2 Accounts of the

at 7A.
number of Federal Register pages in President Clinton's last quarter

range from a high of 26,542, to a low of 25,605. See CongressionalReview Act: Hearing
Before the House Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Res. & Regulatory Affairs, Comm.
on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong. (March 27, 2001) (testimony of Dr. Wendy L. Gramm,

Distinguished Senior Fellow Director, Regulatory Studies Program, Mercatus Center,
George Mason University), available at 2001 WL 2006447 (testifying that there were over
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administration may be particularly notable for the sheer volume of its end-ofterm activity, it is by no means unique. The increase in regulatory activity at
the end of presidential terms has been well-documented going back to at least
3
1948.
More qualitatively, it appears that important regulatory matters were finally
resolved as the end of the Clinton administration approached. Regulations that
had been under review for years, going back as far as the first week of the
Clinton administration, were finally issued in the months before President
Bush took office. 4 In addition to agencies issuing regulations, President
Clinton, in the waning days of his presidency, personally took a number of
actions in areas that are statutorily or constitutionally delegated to the
discretion of the President. He designated many new national monuments and
expanded the boundaries of several others. He also granted a number of
pardons, at least one of which prompted an investigation into influence
peddling. 5
President George W. Bush responded in several ways to the activity at the
end of the Clinton administration. Most significantly, President Bush's Chief
of Staff issued a memorandum directing agencies to delay the effective dates
of recently published rules, not to issue any new regulations, and to withdraw
finalized but not yet published regulations from the Federal Register. This
action effectively delayed their issuance, since publication in the Federal
Register is the required last step before regulations become effective. 6 The
26,542 pages printed during the last three months of Clinton's presidency); Press Release,
Mercatus Center, President Clinton Sets Record for Midnight Regulations (Jan. 23, 2001)
available at http://www.mercatus.org/article.php/138.html (last accessed Oct. 21, 2003)
("To date, 25,605 pages have been published."); see also Jay Cochran, III, The Cinderella
Constraint: Why Regulations Increase Significantly During Post-Election Quarters 3 n.6
(Mar. 8, 2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author), available at
http://www.mercatus.org/pdf/materials/459.pdf (last accessed Nov. 3, 2003) (studying the
number of pages published in the Federal Register over specific time periods in various
presidential administrations).
3 Cochran, supra note 2, at 3.
4 For example, a revision of the gag rule, which regulates whether federally funded
family planning clinics may discuss abortion with their clients, was proposed in the first
year of the Clinton administration and was issued in the last year of the administration. See
The Title X "Gag Rule", 58 Fed. Reg. 7455 (Feb. 5, 1993) (suspending the gag rule); see
also Standards of Compliance for Abortion-Related Services in Family Planning Service
Projects, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,270 (July 3, 2000) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59) (adopting
final rules concerning the revocation of the gag rule).
5 See, e.g., Susan Milligan, InaugurationDay; Reluctantly, a PresidentLets Go, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 21, 2001, at Al (describing President Clinton's actions in the last days of his
presidency, including the events of his last day).
6 See Memorandum for Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001) [hereinafter Card Memorandum]; see also infra
note 127 (providing the text of the memorandum). According to one commentator, after this
memorandum was issued, agencies "withdrew 124 regulations from the [Office of the
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Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") engaged in a review of late-term
Clinton administration rules, and in some cases, Bush administration officials
7
suspended the effectiveness of rules in order to conduct reviews.
The friction that occurs at the transition point between two administrations
raises a number of interesting issues regarding presidential power and
administrative law generally. Is the flurry of activity at the end of an
administration legally suspect? I do not ask merely whether the impending
change of administrations places a formal bar against administrative action, but
also whether actions at the end of an administration may be more vulnerable to
attack on judicial review or to revision by the incoming administration.
Focusing on the activities of the incoming administration, does the President
have the power to take actions like those taken by President Bush in 2001, such
as delaying the effective date of issued regulations or withdrawing regulations
from the Federal Register before they are published? As a general matter,
should presidential or administrative action be judged (legally or politically)
more harshly, or possibly more leniently, because it occurs at the point of
transition?
When assessing the legality of presidential or administrative action in
periods of transition, it is necessary to look first at the reasons why presidential
and administrative action tends to increase at the term's end. The reasons for
the phenomenon may influence views both on the propriety of late-term action
and on the new administration's power to deal with the effects of such action.
Looking principally at actions taken during the waning days of the Clinton
administration, it appears that most "midnight regulation" falls into one of
three rough categories, which I term "hurrying," "delay," and "waiting."
"Hurrying" results from the normal tendency to work right up until a
deadline-the end is approaching and what once seemed like plenty of time is

Federal Register] and postponed the effective dates of ninety regulations."

William M.

Jack, Comment, Taking Care that PresidentialOversight of the Regulatory Process is
Faithfully Executed.- A Review of Rule Withdrawals and Rule Suspensions under the Bush
Administration'sCardMemorandum, 54 ADMrN. L. REV. 1479, 1481 (2002).
7 For example, at the beginning of the Bush administration, the Environmental Protection

Agency ("EPA") suspended a rule on arsenic in drinking water, but later lifted the
suspension after a review revealed that the rule had a sound policy basis. See National
Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New
Source Contaminants Monitoring: Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 16,134 (Mar. 23,
2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142) (temporarily delaying for sixty days the
rule promulgated by the EPA to lower current arsenic standard in water from 50 parts per
billion (ppb) to 10 ppb); accord National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and
Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg.
20,580 (Apr. 23, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142); cf National Primary
Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source
Contaminants Monitoring: Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,342 (May 22, 2001) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142) (announcing the administration's decision to leave
the compliance date for the new arsenic standard unchanged).
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now reduced; the administration must "hurry" to finish its work. Sometimes
hurrying is a result of a desire to do more at the end of the term, cramming in
as much work as possible to extend the administration's influence beyond its
temporal limit. By "delay," I mean delay due to external forces, for example
where Congress legislatively prohibits particular agency action for a time or
where legislative authorization for agency action occurs late in the President's
term. Finally, by "waiting," I mean a deliberate decision to wait until very late
in the term to finalize action. For example, the outgoing administration may
"wait" until after the November election to finalize action so that the President
or the candidate of his party to succeed him (or party members seeking election
to Congress) will not suffer adverse political consequences that might flow
from a controversial action.
In addition to purely legal questions, the problem of "midnight regulations"
raises interesting normative questions concerning what constitutes appropriate
behavior for an outgoing President and administration. There are arguments,
based both on principle and on consequences, that in some circumstances
"midnight regulations" are problematic. The arguments of principle are
somewhat difficult to grasp, but in essence, the question is whether the
outgoing leadership of a country-especially where the voters have selected a
different political party-should work for an easy, productive transition or
instead should work to advance its own agenda and interests until the very last
moment of power. Arguments based on consequences focus on the waste of
time and effort that occurs when the new administration must dig itself out
from under the remains of the outgoing administration, especially when the
outgoing administration knows that this is inevitable.
The same late-term administrative actions can raise concerns on both fronts.
Sometimes a prior administration's actions appear to be designed merely to tie
the hands of the next administration, for example by imposing rules very late
in a term that will place procedural burdens on future administrative action.
Rules imposed very late in the President's term appear to be aimed primarily at
the next administration. Other late-term action may entail a significant outlay
of government resources without hope of actually coming to fruition in
government policy, as when an administration initiates a long-term regulatory
process at the very end of a term even though it is clear that the incoming
administration has a different view on the matter involved.
Some late-term action appears designed merely to embarrass the incoming
administration. The outgoing administration may impose rules in a politically
charged area, such as abortion or the environment, that it knows the incoming
administration will dismantle. The timing suggests that there was no hope that
the rules would actually be implemented, but rather were passed in an attempt
to embarrass the new administration by forcing it to revise or repeal the rules.
With regard to many late-term actions, especially procedural constraints on the
President or administrative agencies, one must question why such constraints
were not necessary during the outgoing administration's term, but suddenly
became essential at a time when they would constrain only the incoming
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administration. Absent a reasonable explanation, the likely conclusion is that
the actions were designed solely to tie the hands of the successor and may not
be at all necessary.
The flurry of administrative activity at the end of a term may thus be seen as
an abuse of presidential power and contrary to social welfare. People should
be able to trust the President to behave with honor and good judgment at the
end of the term. This includes an expectation that the President will not
sabotage or resist the inevitable change of administrations by trying to extend
the administration's influence beyond the end of its term. Presidents should
refrain from taking major policy initiatives late in their terms, especially when
the incoming administration is sure to take a different view and is able to
reverse the action. Further, administrations should not take action just to make
the transition more difficult, for example, by flooding the Federal Register with
rules and other documents in the administration's final days that surely will be
reexamined by the incoming administration.8
Conversely, there are reasonable arguments supporting the notion that such
end-of-term actions are not undesirable. Beginning with the premise that the
President retains all of the presidential powers until the transition actually
occurs, late-term presidential and administrative action may be desirable both
as a matter of principle and practicality. As a matter of principle, the actions of
an aggressive outgoing administration are within the powers recognized under
the Constitution and are part of this country's political process. The outgoing
administration's actions may be legitimate attempts to enhance the outgoing
party's political power and advance its performance in subsequent elections.
Efforts to embarrass or hamstring the incoming administration are all part of
the political process and are perfectly acceptable as a matter of principle.
Simply put, the outgoing administration should be free to advance its political
agenda until the end of its term.
Aggressive late-term action may also be desirable from a more pragmatic
standpoint. A lame-duck President and administration may be freed from
interest group pressure and thus be able to advance social welfare without
concern for the political consequences. Late in the President's term, and
especially during the period between the end-of-term election and the
inauguration of a new President, the President's need for ongoing interest
group support may be reduced so that the President can act with a much greater
I Commentators have previously recognized the problems with this sort of activity near
the end of a president's term, but they (as 1) have found it difficult to articulate exactly what

is wrong with the late term increase in activity. Professor Nina Mendelson characterizes it
as "unseemly," "suggest[ing] an unsatisfied craving for power," as possibly "generat[ing] a
broader cynicism about those in power" and, when conducted by an agency, as
"antidemocratic." Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and
Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 564-67 (2003).

Professor Mendelson observes, however, that the effects of what she calls "burrowing" are
not so simple and fuller analysis is necessary to appreciate fully the costs and benefits of
various forms of burrowing. See id. at 567.
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focus on the overall public interest. Further, the incoming President has
adequate recourse for anything the outgoing President might do, and Congress
might also subject late-term action to effective oversight. It is thus unclear
whether "midnight regulation" is really cause for serious concern. However,
even if "midnight regulations" present little, if any, normative concern,
questions remain concerning how and why they happen, and the ways in which
they are dealt with by incoming Presidents. It is these questions with which
this article is primarily concerned.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I describes actions that a President
might take in the waning days of an administration. Part II describes the
reactions that late-term actions might provoke from the incoming
administration. Both of these parts draw predominantly on examples from the
transition between Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Part III
discusses possible reforms to help incoming administrations deal with
"midnight regulation," 9 and determines that, while reforms aimed at both
outgoing and incoming administrations are possible, reforms aimed primarily
at enhancing the ability of incoming administrations to handle "midnight
regulations" are likely to be more desirable. This part also includes a more
general discussion of presidential involvement in the administrative process.
Part IV concludes that "midnight regulations" are likely here to stay, but if the
phenomenon is viewed as problematic, reforms are possible.
I.

ACTIONS BY OUTGOING PRESIDENTS AND ADMINISTRATIONS:
"MIDNIGHT REGULATION"?

In this Part, I explain and analyze the end-of-term action Presidents take that
may excite controversy. I will use examples drawn principally from the
transition between the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies, because
it is the most recent, and a great deal of information about it is readily
available. The analysis includes a discussion of why a President might wait
until the end of a term to take certain actions, and whether existing constraints
hinder the President from taking action at the end of a term. In the next Part, I
examine actions taken by incoming Presidents, using many examples from the
early days of George W. Bush's presidency. There, I discuss the tools the new
President can employ to dismantle the predecessor's actions, and analyze the
formal and informal constraints that hinder or prevent the new President from
utilizing those tools.
As a general matter, it should be obvious that the incumbent President
remains in office and retains all the powers of the presidency until the moment
the new President is inaugurated, and that agency officials retain all the powers
of their offices until they resign or are removed. As a formal matter, the
President can take whatever actions the Constitution, treaties, statutes, rules
and customs allow. It should be just as obvious, however, that when the
I The possibility of reform is based on the assumption that "midnight regulations"
present a real problem.
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President needs cooperation from Congress (or at least the Senate), the
President often cannot, as a practical matter, exercise the full extent of his
powers throughout the term, and the ability to act in some areas may be
curtailed markedly as the end approaches. The most obvious example of this is
the power to appoint federal judges and other federal officials with protected
job tenure, such as commissioners with fixed terms. Appointments take
time-backgrounds must be checked, support must be garnered, agency
officials must be consulted. Even if all the executive branch work is complete,
a minority in the Senate can prevent the confirmation of appointments made by
an outgoing President.10 Only if the outgoing President's party has a filibusterproof majority in the Senate is the President able to push through last minute
appointments. "
A.

The Pace and Nature ofRegulatory Action at the End of
the President'sTerm

As noted above, research reveals that the pace of regulatory activity clearly
increases as the end of a presidential term approaches. Measured simply by
the number of pages published in the Federal Register, one study concluded
that "one can expect an average increase in regulatory output of 27.4 percent"
in the last three months of an administration, when compared with the same
three month period in years in which there is no looming change of
administrations. 12 As the author of the study admits, the volume of Federal
Register pages is a rather crude measurement of regulatory activity, but still,
there is not much question that certain kinds of regulatory activity increase as
13
the end draws near.
President Clinton's administration took several different sorts of actions that
might be categorized as "end-of-term" actions. Federal agencies issued
important rules right up to the very end of President Clinton's second term,
including the ergonomics rules and revised rules on the obligations of federal
contractors in the affirmative action area, both issued by the Department of
Labor, the revision of the gag rule discussed above, issued by the Department

S. Doc. No. 106-1, R. XXII, at 21 (2000) (providing
that debate shall be ended by a three-fifths majority vote). A minority in the Senate can
prevent an appointment at any time, but the power of the minority at the end of the term
may be amplified because the outgoing President may have little or nothing to offer the
minority in exchange for cooperating in the confirmation process. Id.
" See Mendelson, supra note 8, at 606-10 (discussing the tendency of outgoing
administrations to shape the future of agencies by moving political appointees to civil
service career positions and promoting loyal employees within civil service positions; these
strategies avoid the necessity of Senate confirmation).
2 See Cochran, supranote 2, at 12.
13 Id. at 2 n.4 (listing several potential limitations in using the number of Federal Register
pages as a proxy for end-of-term regulatory activity, but also explaining why the page count
should function as an approximation of the total volume of regulations issued).
0 STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE,
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of Health and Human Services ("HHS") in the last year of President Clinton's
second term after being under consideration for his entire presidency, 14 and
rules on arsenic in drinking water issued by the EPA in January 2001, just
before President Bush took office. 15 In addition to agency rules issued by
various organs of the executive branch, President Clinton himself issued a
number of executive orders and released proclamations creating new national
monuments and expanding the boundaries of several existing national
monuments. 16 The President also issued many pardons and clemencies during
the last several days of his administration. In one relatively unpublicized
matter, in December 2000, the administration issued a waiver of conflict of
interest rules to allow the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to participate in
agency dealings with a company in which the Commissioner owned a
substantial amount of stock.' 7
B.

The Reasonsfor Late-Term Regulatory Action:
Hurrying,Delay, and Waiting

One of the most durable and significant steps an outgoing administration can
take is to issue new agency rules near the end of a term. Why would there be
an increase in the issuance of agency rules at the end of a term? The most
obvious answer, and the one focused on by the authors of the Mercatus
Institute study, is the Cinderella constraint: the end of the term deadline is
approaching and it is time to finish. 18 There is no question that a looming
deadline is often an effective impetus to finish work, and here, because of its
finality, the deadline is likely to be very effective. Regulators are often aware
that they will not be able to act once the transition has occurred. No extensions
are possible when the ability to issue the rule is tied to the occupant of the
White House.
The focus on the Cinderella constraint is, however, incomplete, or at least
" See Title X "Gag Rule", 58 Fed. Reg. 7455, 7455 (Feb. 5, 1993).
15 See

National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976 (Jan. 22, 2001)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141,142).
16See Milligan, supra note 5.
'7 See John Berlau, IRS Boss Snagged Clinton Waiver, INSIGHT ON NEWS, May 7, 2001,
available at http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm?include=detail&storyid=213244 (last
accessed Oct. 23, 2003) (describing the Clinton administration's waiver of the conflict of
interest rules, allowing IRS Commissioner Charles 0. Rossotti to join in agency discussions
and decisions relating to a company in which he owned a substantial interest). The waiver
was not published when granted, but a law suit was subsequently brought to compel
disclosure. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 326 F.3d 1309, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(detailing Judicial Watch's attempt to gain access to, inter alia, information concerning
Commissioner "Rossotti's receipt of a conflict-of-interest waiver").
18 See Cochran, supra note 2, at 4 (describing the "Cinderella constraint" as the rush of
work done by the President, Cabinet officers, and agency heads "to promulgate regulations
before they turn back into ordinary citizens at the stroke of midnight").

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 83:947

too general to be helpful, because administrative and presidential action is
pushed to the end of the President's term for various reasons. In general, there
are three distinct phenomena that contribute to late-term administrative action,
although it appears that often the phenomena combine to help explain the
timing of a single action. I call the three hurrying, waiting, and delay.
Hurrying means that an administration is rushing at the end of the term to
accomplish more, hoping to project its substantive agenda as far into the future
as possible. This is the purest version of the Cinderella constraint. Waiting
refers to the tendency of the administration to wait until very late in the term
for a specific reason, such as avoiding political consequences that might have
been costly earlier in the term or taking action that the administration is happy
to apply to a subsequent administration, but did not want to apply to itself.
Delay means that the action was delayed by some external force, such as
pressure or even a prohibition from Congress or because of a cumbersome
procedure.
Administrative action, including the promulgation of rules, most likely
increases at the end of the term due to a combination of these factors. In some
instances, action is delayed against the administration's wishes and needs to be
finished in a hurry. In others, the push at the end of the term is simply an
attempt to accomplish more in the allotted time or a desire to extend the
administration's influence beyond the end of a term. In still other cases, the
push at the end of the term is the result of a decision to wait in order to avoid
adverse political consequences or to aim administrative action at the next
administration without affecting itself.
It may seem somewhat surprising that so much important regulatory activity
does not occur until the end of the term. If something is important enough to
trigger federal action, it is logical to think that the agency would want to
complete the rulemaking process as quickly as possible. Consequently, one
might think that a great deal of end-of-term activity must involve agencies
acting as quickly as possible, and that the outgoing administration hurries at
the end of the term to do even more than it had been doing throughout the
years or is acting to overcome the consequences of delay by external forces.
While the above factors certainly contribute to the end-of-term increase in
regulatory activity, intentional waiting also appears to be an important
contributing factor. The discussion that follows attempts to illustrate how the
three phenomena contribute to the apparent end-of-term rush.
There are many potential explanations for the delay in completing the
rulemaking process.
Simple procrastination is surely one explanation.
However, there are many other likely contributors. Stringent judicial review
has made the rulemaking process more thorough and time consuming. The
more of a record an agency perceives it needs to support a rule, and the more
care necessary to avoid procedural defects, the longer the process will take.
This will naturally push more rules toward the deadline. In general, less
deferential judicial review tends to lengthen the rulemaking process, pushing it
closer to the end of the administration.
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Other factors also make significant contributions to delay. Executive orders
providing for centralized review require that proposed rules be submitted to
OMB in advance of promulgation to give OMB a period of time to review the
rules.' 9 It takes time to prepare a submission to OMB, including, in most
cases, a cost-benefit analysis and various other required elements. OMB is
allowed time to complete its review and it may reject part or all of a proposed
rule or prescribe revisions, requiring more time for the agency to respond to
OMB's concerns. 20 An agency may also be required to prepare an
environmental impact statement or a report to comply with laws protecting
endangered species. These and other steps in the regulatory process tend to
increase the time needed to complete the rulemaking process, pushing more
rules further into the President's tern.
The politics surrounding the rulemaking process may also contribute to the
tendency for rule promulgation to take longer. When agencies consider rules,
the process does not begin with the publication of a proposal and end with the
close of the comment period and a quick issuance of rules based on the record.
Rather, in advance of a rulemaking, the agency may consult with key members
of Congress and private interests to test the waters regarding possible
proposals. Rules frequently undergo several rounds of such consultation
before a proposal is actually published in the Federal Register. Congress
sometimes responds quite directly, enacting legislation against the proposed
rules. For example, the Clinton administration's ergonomics rules were
delayed by repeated appropriations riders prohibiting the Department of Labor
21
from using any of its funds to promulgate a rule on ergonomic injuries.
Political delay can affect rules even when notice and comment are
accomplished expeditiously. After the comment period closes, agency officials
may leak possible decisions, which provokes lobbying by interested persons.
This can lead to reconsideration of the rules, after which a new proposal is
generated and subsequently leaked, provoking another round of lobbying and
so on. This process can continue for a long time, until agency officials finally
determine that they have reached the optimal position in terms of maximum
'9 See Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981) (President Reagan's
executive order requiring all major regulations to be accompanied by a "regulatory impact

analysis" submitted to OMB to centralize the control of the regulatory process); see also
Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70

U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 824-30 (2003) (describing the origination of OMB's role in the
regulatory process); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1995) (describing and critiquing OMB oversight in light of
democracy and the administrative state); Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of
Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental ProtectionAgency Rulemaking Under

Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1 (1984) (explaining consequences of
OMB oversight of agency rulemaking).
20 See sources cited supra note 19.
2 See, e.g., Department of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-78, 111 Stat. 1467 (1997).
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support for the rules, minimal opposition to the rules, and greatest public
policy gain (if that is a relevant consideration). At that point, or at the end of
the term if the deadline forces action, the agency issues its rules.
Politics may also explain why administrations choose to wait until the very
end of the President's term to take important administrative action. As the end
of a term nears, the political costs of taking action may decrease, which may
free an administration to take action that it could not have taken earlier in its
term. As discussed above, an administration strives to optimize net political
gains. Near the end of a term, political costs and benefits may be less
important to the administration, including the President. An outgoing
President is unlikely to seek elective office again and, as the term draws to an
end, the President may have little need for political support and may no longer
be worried about political opposition. An outgoing President may no longer
need cooperation from Congress and thus may care much less if an
administrative action provokes opposition.
It is difficult, in the abstract, to draw any conclusions on whether waiting to
avoid political consequences is desirable or not. The fact that the President
acts on important matters after the political consequences are lessened appears
to be an affront to democracy. Still, public choice scholarship often laments
the influence narrow interests have over government action, and an outgoing
administration, free of the necessity of seeking reelection and concern about its
ability to advance its entire program, might be able to rise above narrow
interests and take action in its waning days that benefits the general public
interest.
Action at the end of a term may sometimes be more important to agency
officials than to the President. Although the President may have some concern
over his opportunities after leaving office, the President is likely to be
relatively secure with regard to his prospects after the end of the term when
compared to other officials in the administration. The President might be
worried about his place in history, and perhaps somewhat concerned with the
prospects of his party, but agency officials are likely to have more immediate
concerns regarding their employment prospects after the transition. Many noncareer officials need to secure positions after the term, and the actions they
take while in government service may affect their prospects. Action taken at
or near the end of an administration may assist the search for employment in
the industry their agency regulated. For officials who intend to remain in an
agency after the transition, end-of-term action might be important to secure
their position in the new administration, such as action involving a program
they helped design or which they would be involved in implementing.
An administration may wait to take important action for other, even more
suspect, reasons. There may be instances in which an administration waits to
act because, while it is happy to tie the hands of the next administration, it does
not want to operate under the rules adopted late in the term. Imagine, for
example, an administration adopting strict conflict of interest rules covering
administrative officials near the end of its term. It preferred not to operate
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under the restrictive rules, but it finds it appropriate to impose those rules on its
successor. Another related reason for waiting is that the administration may
act only to force its successor to take politically costly action. Returning to the
example above, the new administration might find the late-term rules too
restrictive, but it may be reluctant to repeal them and bear the political
consequences of appearing more ethically lax than its predecessor. The same
phenomenon may lead to reluctance to repeal a late-term environmental
regulation-an incoming administration may not want to appear anti22
environmental, even if it is convinced that the regulation is unwise.
Regardless of the political reasons favoring waiting until the end of a term to
take important agency action, there are also strong disincentives against
waiting. These disincentives mean that it would be surprising if waiting is a
very common strategy. First and simplest, the agency might not finish on time,
thus causing all the preparatory work to go to waste and failing to accomplish
the action's goals. Second, taking action at or near the end of the term greatly
reduces the administration's ability to enjoy the political benefits flowing from
the action. Although officials other than the President might benefit if lateterm action helps the President's party in subsequent elections, unless the
President's party is continuing in power, there is very little time at the end of a
term for beneficiaries of late-term action to reward the administration by
cooperating in other areas. This may indicate that the action was not that
important, or that the political benefits from taking it were not that great or
were outweighed by the political costs that would have been incurred if the
action had been taken earlier. Third, end-of-term actions may be substantially
less effective. If the rule needs to be enforced or interpreted, or if additional
action is needed to make a mechanism associated with the rule work properly,
the new administration can significantly undercut the effectiveness of the rule.
If the rule is challenged on judicial review, the new administration may not
enthusiastically defend the rule, and the rule might be invalidated or limited
when a better defense might have vindicated the rule.
The lengthy process of promulgating rules means that the category of
"midnight regulations" should be quite small in terms of regulatory action that
occurs "below the political radar." The process for submitting rules to OMB
for approval, conducting notice and comment proceedings, and engaging in the
usual less formal political process surrounding rulemakings means that an
administration must, in the vast majority of cases, inform the public of
rulemaking proposals well before the presidential election in November.
Further, the President must be concerned with Congress's procedure for
reviewing major rules-if Congress is likely to disapprove a late-term rule, the
President should try to finish the work early enough so any resolution of
disapproval is presented to him rather than his successor. Add to the length of
the process the disincentives to late-term action discussed above, and it seems
22

Consider the outcry regarding the Bush administration's reexamination of the arsenic

in drinking water rule. See supranote 7 and accompanying text.
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unlikely that administrations will purposely wait until the last minute to
promulgate many important rules. Thus, in the rulemaking context, external
delay and hurrying are likely to be better explanations for late-term rules than
waiting.
C.

Examplesfrom the ClintonAdministration

1.

Administrative Rulemaking at the End of the Term
a.

Legislative Rules

To further explore the use of the rulemaking power at the end of the term, I
examine some of the rules issued near the end of the Clinton administration in
order to understand the timing. Of all of President Clinton's end-of-term rules,
the most widely publicized was the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration's ("OSHA") so-called "ergonomics" rule. This rule addressed
a broad spectrum of musculoskeletal disorders caused by repetitive motion,
lifting heavy weights, working with vibrating machinery, and the like. The
rule called for sweeping reforms to work practices and in workplaces where
such disorders were present. The Clinton administration had considered the
issue throughout its tenure, 23 finally publishing the rule on November 14, 2000
to become effective on January 16, 2001,24 just a few days before President
Clinton left office. The rule never actually went into effect because a majority
in both Houses of Congress rejected the rule under the procedure for
congressional review of agency rules established in 1996.25 This was the first
time Congress used that procedure.
The best explanation for the promulgation of the ergonomics rule so close to
the end of President Clinton's tenure is that it was delayed by external forces.
Although on the surface this rule looks like a midnight regulation, as it was
promulgated after the last election before the President left office, it does not
appear that the rule was timed by the agency to avoid the political
23 The first official step in establishing the ergonomics rule was the publication of an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in August 1992. See Ergonomics Safety and
Health Management, 57 Fed. Reg. 34,192 (Aug. 3, 1992). The actual proposed rule was
published on November 23, 1999, and the final rule was issued almost a year later on
November 14, 2000. See Ergonomics Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 65,768 (proposed Nov. 23,
1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910); cf Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,262
(Nov. 14, 2000) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
24 See Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,262.
25 Congressional Review Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, § 251, 110 Stat. 868 (1996)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2000)); see Ergonomics Rule Disapproval, Pub. L. No.
107-408, 115 Stat. 7 (2001) (joint resolution disapproving the ergonomics rule submitted by
the Department of Labor); see also Statement by the President, Office of the Press
Secretary, The White House (Mar. 20, 2001), availableat 2001 WL 273110 (stating that the
President signed the repeal of the "unduly burdensome" ergonomics rule).
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consequences of promulgating it during President Clinton's term. The agency
made its intentions clear when it issued an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in 1992, relatively early in President Clinton's first term. 26 This
notice set off a storm of political activity, and Congress attached
appropriations riders to the Department of Labor's budget for several years,
prohibiting OSHA from going forward with the rule. This battle continued
until the 2000 fiscal year when the rider was left out of the Labor
appropriations bill under a serious veto threat by President Clinton.
Once the appropriations rider was eliminated, OSHA acted relatively
quickly, proposing a rule in November 1999 and promulgating it a year later in
November 2000.27 In the year between proposal and adoption, OSHA received
"nearly 11,000 comments and briefs consisting of nearly 50,000 pages
collectively" and held "9 weeks of public hearings and receive[d] 18,337 pages
of testimony from 714 witnesses. '28 Given the broad scope and high expense
of the rule, OSHA was compiling the sort of record that would give the rule a
chance to survive judicial review, and it was facilitating the sort of political
activity that ought to occur when an agency engages in major rulemaking.
Unfortunately, the timing doomed the rule because, by the time the agency
promulgated the rule and Congress rejected it, President Clinton was no longer
in office to veto Congress's action. President Bush, who was not as
enthusiastic about ergonomic injury regulation as his predecessor, signed the
29
rejection, thus preventing the ergonomics rule from becoming law.
There is also the lingering question of why President Clinton waited until
his last year in office to utilize his presidential power. Why didn't he threaten
to veto the appropriations bill years earlier when the ergonomics rules had a
fighting chance to survive? Perhaps President Clinton acted late in his term to
symbolically help his Vice President's campaign, but was unwilling to bear the
political costs that the ergonomics rules would have entailed earlier in his term.
In other words, it may be that actions with the appearance of delay may turn
out to be, at least in part, instances of waiting-the President could have taken
action to remove the delay but chose not to until late in the term.
Another example among the numerous end-of-term rules issued by the
Clinton administration is the EPA's rule reducing the amount of arsenic
allowed in drinking water. This rule was actually published in the Federal
26 See Ergonomics Safety and Health Management, 57 Fed. Reg. 34192 (proposed Aug.

3, 1992) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (providing advance notice of proposed
rulemaking regarding ergonomic hazards and disorders).
27

See Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,262. OSHA stated that in 1999 and 2000 it

"focused most of its rulemaking resources on issuing an ergonomics standard before the end
of the former Administration's term." See Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao,
314 F.3d 143, 157 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted). The ergonomics rule was
issued in slightly less than a year, which prompted the court to characterize the procedure
under which the rule was issued as "remarkably compressed." Id.
28 Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. at 68,264.
29 See supra note 25.
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Register on January 22, 2001, two days after George W. Bush became
President, but it was submitted to the Federal Register for publication before
the transition. 30 While this action appears to be about as midnight as midnight
can get, examining the chronology reveals that there may not have been much
delay in promulgating the rule. The EPA promulgated the rule in response to a
1996 congressional directive, which stated that the agency should propose a
standard for arsenic in early 2000 and finalize a rule by January 1, 2001.31 The
rule was proposed on June 22, 2000,32 six months late and just a few months
before the November presidential election. The EPA could have acted more
quickly, and perhaps it waited just to put the new President in the awkward
position of having to reject an important environmental rule. Still, waiting
until after the election does not appear to be a good political explanation for
the delay, since the rule was proposed well before the 2000 election. While it
certainly took the agency some time to study the issues thoroughly enough to
issue a sensible proposal, perhaps the issuance of the proposal was further
delayed by the usual political jockeying that occurs in Washington around any
major issue. 33 Whatever the cause, it is curious that Congress itself set a
timetable under which it was virtually certain that the rule would be issued by
the outgoing President in the period between the election and the inauguration
of his successor.
One of the most interesting regulations issued in the final year of the Clinton
administration was the revision of the rule regulating the activities of family
planning clinics that receive federal funds. The statute governing the
distribution of federal money prohibits federal funding for "programs where
abortion is a method of family planning. ' '34 Given the controversial nature of
the abortion issue, each administration has tended to interpret and enforce this
provision in line with the administration's overall position on abortion. During
the Reagan administration, a rule was adopted, through notice and comment
rulemaking, that not only prohibited clinics receiving federal funds from
providing abortions, but also prohibited all clinic personnel from counseling
30

See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to

Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976 (Jan. 22, 2001)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142).
31 In section 1412(b)(12)(A) of the Safe Drinking Water Act, as amended August 6,

1996, Congress directed the EPA to propose a national primary drinking water regulation
for arsenic by January 1, 2000 and issue the final regulation by January 1, 2001. See 42
U.S.C. § 300g-I (2000).
32 See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 65 Fed. Reg. 38,888 (June 22,
2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141, 142).
33The rule's effective date was March 23, 2001 with some of the provisions actually
going into operation much later to give water suppliers time to make the changes necessary
to comply with the rule. The new administration's EPA administrator withdrew the rule for
reconsideration. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
14See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (2000).
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patients on abortion as a method of family planning and from referring patients
elsewhere for abortions. 35 This rule, which was upheld against statutory and
constitutional challenges, 3 6 was referred to as the "gag rule" because it
restricted communication between clinic personnel and their patients. A
violation of the rule could result in a loss of federal funding for the clinic. 37
The first President Bush directed HHS to interpret the gag rule as not
restricting doctor-patient communication. 38 The D.C. Circuit held as unlawful
an interpretative rule issued by HHS in response to the President's directive, on
the ground that, because the agency promulgated the gag rule through notice
and comment rulemaking, it could not be fundamentally administratively
altered without a new notice and comment proceeding. 39 There things stood
until President Clinton took office. On his second day in office, President
Clinton ordered his new HHS Secretary to suspend the existing gag rule and
promulgate a replacement. 40 The Secretary complied in both regards on
February 5, 1993, suspending the gag rule (without notice and comment) 4 1 and
proposing new regulations for public comment. 42 The gag rule remained in
administrative limbo until July 3, 2000 when the new rule was made final. 43
Under the new rule, clinics are not only allowed to provide information on
abortion, but they must offer pregnant women the opportunity to receive
44
information on abortion.
The timing of the new rule makes it appear that the only reason for

31 Statutory Prohibition on Use of Appropriated Funds in Programs Where Abortion is a
Method of Family Planning; Standard of Compliance for Family Planning Services Projects,
53 Fed. Reg. 2922, 2928 (Feb. 2, 1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59).
36 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1992) (upholding the "gag rule" against
statutory and constitutional challenges).
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6.
38 See Nat'l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227,
230 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (referring to the President's memorandum to the Secretary of HHS
urging that the confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship be preserved).
39 See id. (holding that the agency must grant the opportunity for public notice and
comment before changing the rule).
40 See The Title X "Gag Rule", 58 Fed. Reg. 7455, 7455 (Feb. 5, 1993) (memorandum
from President Clinton to the Secretary of Health and Human Services suspending the gag
rule).
41 See Standards of Compliance for Abortion-Related Services in Family Planning
Service Projects, 58 Fed. Reg. 7462 (Feb. 5, 1993) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59)
(suspending the gag rule).
42 See Standards of Compliance for Abortion-Related Services in Family Planning
Service Projects, 58 Fed. Reg. 7464 (proposed Feb. 5, 1993) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
59) (proposing new rule on abortion counseling).
43 See Standards of Compliance for Abortion-Related Services in Family Planning
Service Projects, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,270, 41,278 (July 3, 2000) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
59) (adopting new rule on abortion counseling).
44 See id. at 41,279.
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promulgating it at all was to tie the hands of the incoming administration
(provided the other party won the election), or at least force that administration
to engage in the notice and comment process if it wished to re-impose a more
restrictive version of the rule. As far as I can discern, no external force
delayed the promulgation of this rule. Given that President Clinton and his
administration acted forcefully to suspend the more restrictive gag rule in their
first days and weeks in office, and that the final rule was issued before the
2000 election, it seems unlikely that the administration was waiting so as to
avoid the political consequences of the rule. Perhaps the administration
wanted to wait until all the elections that could affect President Clinton during
his term were over, but that seems unlikely given the timing of the initial
assault on the previous rule.
The notion that the administration promulgated the rule near the end of
President Clinton's term merely to make it more difficult for a successor to
implement a different policy is also supported by the nature of the rule. The
rule's only purpose is to establish parameters under which clinics could lose
their federal funding for using abortion as a method of family planning through
an administrative procedure initiated within HHS. 45 There are no other
consequences for violating the rule. In light of President Clinton's control over
HHS during his administration, there was apparently no need for the rule
during the first seven years of his presidency (except that the statute governing
the program required that grants and contracts under the program be
administered according to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of HHS), 46
and it was highly unlikely that HHS would begin proceedings to take away the
federal funds of family planning clinics in the last few months of the
administration. In the run of rules possibly called "midnight regulations," this
one seems particularly suspect because it appears to have no legitimate, nontiming related purpose.
This episode raises questions about whether this rule is an appropriate
subject for notice and comment rulemaking at all. Originally, HHS used
regulations and memoranda issued without notice and comment to inform
funding recipients of its policies regarding permissible activities. 47 It may only
be presidential involvement due to politics that led to the use of notice and
comment procedures for later versions of the rules. Section 553 of the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), the provision on notice and comment
rulemaking, explicitly states that it does not apply to rules concerning agency

45 Notice, Provision of Abortion-Related Services in Family Planning Services Projects,
65 Fed. Reg. 41,281, 41,281 (July 3, 2000) (notifying the public of agency's interpretation
of statutes and regulations regarding abortion counseling in federally funded clinics).
46 The statute governing the program required that grants and contracts under the
program "shall be made in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary [of the HHS]
may promulgate." 42 U.S.C. § 300a-4(a) (2000).
47 See Grants for Family Planning Services, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,465 (proposed Sept. 15,
1971) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59).
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grants and contracts. 48 Even if section 553 applied to these categories of rules
generally, this particular rule is more in the nature of an interpretative rule,
construing the legislative prohibition against the use of abortion as a method of
family planning, or in the nature of a policy statement, informing a possible
target of federal enforcement action of when the agency might take such
action. 49 Section 553 exempts both interpretative rules and policy statements
50
from its notice and comment requirements.
Because an incoming administration can easily revoke or revise rules issued
without notice and comment, an outgoing administration might try to make it
more difficult for the incoming administration by using notice and comment
procedures to issue rules, such as these family planning rules, that could have
been issued without notice and comment. The conventional wisdom seems to
be that it takes new notice and comment rulemaking procedures to revise or
amend such rules, 51 even if the rules did not require notice and comment in the
first place. 52 By using notice and comment, moreover, administrations have
been able to tie their successors' hands in the abortion rulemaking arena.
The history of the rules on abortion funding, even before President Reagan's
gag rule, bears out the impression that administrations have used notice and
18 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2000) (providing an exception
from the notice and comment requirements for matters "relating to agency management or
personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts").
49 See Standards of Compliance for Abortion-Related Services in Family Planning
Service Projects, 65 Fed. Reg. at 41,278.
50 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
5' See Nat'l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227,
231 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("When an agency promulgates a legislative regulation by notice and
comment... it may not subsequently repudiate that announced meaning and substitute for it
a totally different meeting without proceeding through the notice and comment rulemaking
normally required for amendments of a rule.").
52 See id. at 239 ("Moreover, this case concerns not an agency's first attempt at
interpreting a statutory term but a situation where the agency has, through legislative
rulemaking, already interpreted that statute, and is now changing that interpretation."). The
main argument in favor of the conventional wisdom is that it avoids controversy over the
proper procedure for revoking or revising a rule-administrations know that any rule
promulgated pursuant to notice and comment requires the use of similar procedures to
revoke or revise the rule. However, I am not so sure that this should be the case.
The fact that a prior administration decided to provide interested parties and the public
with more procedures than are required does not necessarily imply that all future
administrations must do the same with regard to the issue. What if an agency decided to go
beyond APA requirements and allow persons interested in a rulemaking to cross-examine
experts who have submitted comments in the rulemaking proceeding? Would a subsequent
administration revising the rule also be required to allow cross-examination? I think not.
The conventional wisdom seems even less attractive if the apparent reason for the prior
administration's procedural generosity was to impose constraints on its successor. By
issuing an interpretative rule or policy statement, an administration could promulgate and
later revise the rule without having to use notice and comment procedures.
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comment proceedings in this area primarily to constrain their successors. In
1977, during President Carter's first year in office, his administration proposed
codifying the existing HHS practice via notice and comment rulemaking, 53 but
54
did not actually promulgate the rules until early 1980, his last year in office.
The timing of this codification suggests that President Carter might have used
the issue to gain political support for his reelection campaign, or perhaps tried
to lock his successor into the practice that had developed under the rule during
his administration. This rule remained in place until the last year of the
Reagan administration. In July 1987, President Reagan announced that HHS
would propose a new rule "to give effect to the statutory prohibition on the use
of Title X appropriated funds in programs that include abortion as a method of
family planning. '55 The administration conducted notice and comment
56
rulemaking, which culminated in 1988 with the issuance of the gag rule.
President Reagan's timing also suggests motives involving abortion politics
more than concern over illegitimate uses of federal funds.
It is very interesting that all three notice and comment rulemakings used to
implement the statutory prohibition of Title X occurred in the last year of a
President's administration. This suggests a category of midnight regulations
that should arouse suspicion, i.e. regulations promulgated by an administration
merely to affect its successor. The fact that there was no reason why the
administration could not have promulgated the rules earlier, and there was no
special need for the rules at the time they were promulgated, may raise
questions regarding the legitimacy of the rules. President Carter could have
continued his relatively liberal policy without engaging in notice and comment
rulemaking. If President Reagan did not feel the need to tighten up on
President Carter's policy for more than six years, it is difficult to understand
why he felt the need to stiffen the policy in the eighth year of his
administration. It seems unlikely that the Reagan administration would have
been able to strip clinics of federal funds in those last few months. Similarly,
once President Clinton had control over HHS's enforcement mechanism and
had successfully suspended the operation of the gag rule, it is unclear why he
needed to promulgate new rules in the last year of his administration. If the
administration was concerned about following the statutory mandate that
11 See Grants for Family Planning Services, 42 Fed. Reg. 18,947 (proposed Apr. 11,
1977) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59) (notifying public of agency's intent to issue
proposed rules); accordGrants for Family Planning Services, 43 Fed. Reg. 42,020 (Sept. 19,
1978) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59) (notifying public of proposed rulemaking).
14 Grants for Family Planning Services, 45 Fed. Reg. 37,433 (June 3, 1980) (to be

codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59) (announcing final rule regarding the limits of federal funding
for family planning centers).
15Statutory Prohibition on Use of Appropriated Funds in Programs Where Abortion is a
Method of Family Planning; Standard of Compliance for Family Planning Services Projects,
53 Fed. Reg. 2922, 2922 (Feb. 2, 1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59).
56 Id. ("[T]he rules proposed compliance standards.., to specifically prohibit certain
actions that promote and encourage abortion as a method of family planning ....
").
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regulations promulgated by the Secretary of HHS must govern the grant
program, then the administration should have issued the rules earlier, not seven
years after the initial proposal. Further, the simple fact that the administration
could have promulgated these rules without notice and comment raises
suspicions that they were designed primarily to hinder or inflict costs on the
next administration. Given that abortion is a perennially controversial issue,
there is a strong hint of politics in these rules, i.e. that each administration
promulgated these rules when they did to influence electoral politics and
embarrass potential successors rather than as part of a sincere effort to enforce
federal law.
b.

Nonlegislative Rules

In addition to notice and comment rules, as noted above, agencies can also
issue interpretive rules, guidance statements, and policy statements, which do
not require notice and comment procedures. It does not appear that there was a
surge in the issuance of interpretive rules near the end of the Clinton
administration. In the period between November 5, 2000 and the end of the
Clinton administration, an electronic search of the Federal Register revealed
only one interpretive rule issued by an executive branch agency, 57 and only one
policy statement, which was more in the nature of an interpretive rule set down
for comment by an independent agency. 58 Starting the search from June 1,
2000 reveals that executive branch agencies issued only four additional
interpretive rules or policy statements. 59 Four interpretive rules and two policy
statements in the last seven months of an administration does not look like
much of an end-of-term rush.

11

National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Review of

Decisions to Amend or Revise Plans, 66 Fed. Reg. 1864 (Jan. 10, 2001) (to be codified at 36
C.F.R. pt. 219) (interpreting land and resource management planning rules "to make explicit

its intent regarding the procedure(s) that citizens and entities may use to appeal or object to
plan revisions or amendments .... ).
11 Policy Statement on Reporting Information Under 15 U.S.C. 2064(b) About
Potentially Hazardous Products Distributed Outside the United States; Request for
Comments, 66 Fed. Reg. 351 (Jan. 3, 2001) (informing of proposed policy statement
regarding the Consumer Product Safety Commission's interpretation of statutory reporting

requirement).
59 See Court of Competent Jurisdiction, 65 Fed. Reg. 52,301 (Aug. 29, 2000) (to be
codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 47) (interpretive rule); Country of Origin Marking Rules for
Textiles and Textile Products Advanced in Value, Improved in Condition, or Assembled
Abroad, 65 Fed. Reg. 42,634 (July 11, 2000) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. ch. I) (final
interpretive rule); Statement of Agency Policy Concerning Jurisdiction Over the Safety of
Railroad Passenger Operations and Waivers Related to Shared Use of the Tracks of the
General Railroad System by Light Rail and Conventional Equipment, 65 Fed. Reg. 42,529
(July 10, 2000) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 209, 211) (policy statement); Supplemental

Examination Guidelines for Determining the Applicability of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
Reg. 38,510 (June 21, 2000) (notice of interpretive rule).

6, 65 Fed.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 83:947

There may be situations, however, in which an outgoing administration
finds it worthwhile to issue interpretive rules or policy statements late in its
term. An outgoing administration may, for example, issue an interpretive rule
or policy statement in a controversial area to force the incoming administration
to take a public stand on the issue. This could be especially true when the fight
between the parties is over the political center. For example, an outgoing
Democratic administration might issue a policy statement regarding the
enforcement of an abortion-related statute in an attempt to provoke an
incoming Republican administration into revoking or revising it, giving the
Democrats an issue for future campaigns.
In the final year of the Clinton presidency, federal agencies were far from
idle, however, as they published numerous other documents without notice and
comment in an apparent rush to complete work before the end of the term.
These documents included agency guidances and notices informing the public
of new initiatives. 60 Even where the agencies requested comments, the
agencies sometimes felt the need to have a very short comment period so they
could complete the matter before the end of the administration. For example,
on December 18, 2000, the Food and Drug Administration issued a proposed
guidance on how to report adverse effects following the use of veterinary
medicines. 6 1 The notice requested that comments be filed in time "to ensure
their adequate consideration in the preparation of the final document by

60 In the period between June 1, 2000 and the end of the Clinton administration, the EPA
was particularly active, issuing numerous documents informing the public of the
establishment of new agency initiatives and asking for voluntary cooperation in some of
these initiatives. See, e.g., Water Quality Criteria: Notice of Availability of Water Quality
Criterion for the Protection of Human Health: Methylmercury, 66 Fed. Reg. 1344 (Jan. 8,
2001) (issuing water quality criteria for the chemical methylmercury); Policy on Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,858 (Dec. 27, 2000) (announcing, as a final policy, the

EPA's support of using alternative dispute resolution in dealing with conflicts); Voluntary
Children's Chemical Evaluation Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,700 (Dec. 26, 2000) (announcing
creation of a program to evaluate the potential health risk to children from exposure to
certain chemicals); Data Collection and Development on High Production Volume (HPV)
Chemicals, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,686 (Dec. 26, 2000) (announcing data on potentially harmful

chemicals produced in mass quantities). While this still does not appear to be a rush of the
same magnitude as the rush to complete final rules that occurred at the end of the Clinton
administration, it seems that the EPA was hurrying to move things along in the direction
favored by the Clinton administration in areas in which the incoming administration was not
as likely to act.
61 International Cooperation on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for
Registration of Veterinary Medicinal Products (VICH); Draft Guidance on
"Pharmacovigilance of Veterinary Medicinal Products: Management of Adverse Event
Reports (AER's)" (VICH GL24); Availability; Request for Comments, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,111

(proposed Dec. 18, 2000) (requesting comments on a draft guidance describing a reporting
system for identifying adverse events after the use of a marketed veterinary medical
product).
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January 17, 2001." ' 62 Although I have not done the empirical work necessary
to confirm that the volume of guidances and other similar notices increased at
the end of the Clinton administration, I can at least conclude that in its fading
days, the administration issued many such documents. This increased activity
raises the issue of whether it is appropriate for an administration to hurry to
complete this kind of regulatory work at the end of its term.
The question naturally arises as to why an administration would publish
many of these less formal documents near the end of its term. It seems that a
combination of reasons lead to such action. There was probably a great deal of
hurrying to finish work that was not yet complete in a timely manner, simply
due to the normal effects of an impending deadline. There was also probably
some hurrying to get more done near the end of the term in order to have
influence after the transition, and to force the incoming administration to
affirmatively dismantle agency actions with which it disagreed. This could be
calculated to cause political problems for the new administration. There may
also have been some waiting involved, i.e. waiting to issue some potentially
controversial matters until it was so late in the administration that the political
consequences would not much matter. The last explanation is less likely with
guidance documents, interpretive rules, and the like, since these are probably
less controversial and have less of an effect than legislative notice and
comment rules. However, there is still the possibility that this effect exists
even with regard to less important and less visible agency actions.
2.

Presidential Action at the End of the Term

While federal agencies, and not the President himself, issued the rules and
performed the other actions discussed above, President Clinton also took many
actions at or near the end of his term that required his personal action. These
actions included issuing executive orders, designating national monuments,
and granting presidential clemencies and pardons.
a.

Executive Orders

Executive orders are a relatively formal method available to the President to
direct policy within the executive branch. As the President has become a more
visible and active leader of the administrative process, the executive order has
become a more important tool of presidential policymaking. President Clinton
was an active issuer of executive orders, and commentators have raised
questions over whether President Clinton used executive orders to circumvent
normal legislative and administrative processes. 63 The argument is that
62

Id. at 79,112.

63 Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2290-99 (2001)

(tracing President Clinton's use of executive orders and other directives as compared to
previous presidents); see Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of
Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 37-43 (2002) (asserting that

President Clinton's use of executive orders was often inappropriate because his orders went
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President Clinton's executive orders were efforts to unilaterally implement
policies that he could not convince Congress to adopt legislatively. 64 If this is
true, then it is true no matter when the orders were issued, so I will not debate
the point. This article focuses on the timing of executive orders and asks
whether there are special reasons for concern about executive orders issued late
in a President's term.
In the period between June 1, 2000 and the end of his presidency, President
Clinton issued at least thirty-eight executive orders, with twenty-one orders
issued after the November election. 65 In other years of the Clinton presidency,
the number of executive orders in a similar time period typically averaged in
the low to mid-twenties, 66 except in the first year of his presidency, when he
issued forty-two executive orders between June 1, 1993 and January 20, 1994.
Again, while every President retains all presidential powers until the moment
of the successor's inauguration, a President who takes important actions in the
waning days of an administration may leave the impression of improperly
extending his influence beyond his term and perhaps making the transition
more difficult for his successor.
Looking at the very end of President Clinton's term, he issued nine
executive orders after January 15, 2001 or almost one-fourth of the executive
orders issued in the nearly eight month period beginning on June 1, 2000.67
For example, on January 18, 2001, President Clinton issued an executive order
prohibiting federal agencies from promoting the export of tobacco to other

beyond internal management of the executive branch and advanced policies on which he

could not convince Congress to legislate). I did not find Branum's analysis convincing,
mainly because she did not examine in particularity the authority President Clinton cited for
his executive orders, nor did she seem to grasp that President Clinton directed his orders at
the behavior of government officials rather than the public. In any case, as discussed in the
text, resolution of this controversy is not necessary for the purposes of this article.
64Branum, supra note 63, at 38 ("Second, and more troubling, was [Clinton's] tendency
to use presidential directives to implement initiatives that had failed to pass Congress.").
Federal courts have invalidated at least two executive orders in their entirety. The first, and
most famous, was the order by President Truman directing the Secretary of Commerce to
seize steel mills to prevent their closure during a labor dispute. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1952) (holding that the order was beyond the power
granted to the President by the Constitution or any statute). The second was an order by
President Clinton directing federal agencies not to do business with companies that hire
permanent replacements during labor disputes. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Reich,
74 F.3d 1322, 1332-39 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the order was preempted by the
National Labor Relations Act, which allowed employers to hire permanent replacements for
strikers under certain circumstances).
65 1 performed an electronic search and totaled the number of executive orders issued
during this time period.
66 See supra note 65.
67 See supra note 65.
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countries and promoting the use of tobacco in other countries. 68 This order
also required HHS to conduct a "pilot study of tobacco use in a country other
than the United States."'69 Other executive orders issued that same day
prohibited the importation of rough diamonds from some areas in Sierra
Leone, 70 and, pursuant to an earlier executive order setting the matter down for
notice and comment, created the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Coral Reef
71
Ecosystem Reserve.
Additional executive orders issued near the end of President Clinton's term
in office go beyond what one would expect from a leader of a large
organization in the weeks and months before his departure. For example, on
December 23, 2000, President Clinton established a task force to look into the
future of Puerto Rico's status. 72 On January 15, 2001, President Clinton issued
an executive order establishing a task force on Washington, D.C., apparently
formalizing a task force that had existed since 1995 without an executive
order. 73 That same day, President Clinton established the "President's
Commission on Educational Resource Equity" to study and deal with the
problem of inequality in educational resources. 74 On January 10, 2001,
President Clinton issued a detailed executive order regarding the protection of
migratory birds that, in part, required federal agencies "taking actions that
have, or are likely to have, a measurable negative effect on migratory bird
populations.., to develop and implement, within 2 years, a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with the Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) that shall
promote the conservation of migratory bird populations. '75 This executive
order also directed the Service to take steps to ensure that other agencies
76
complied with their obligations under the order.
68 Exec. Order No. 13,193, 66 Fed. Reg. 7387, 7387 (Jan. 18, 2001) ("[E]xecutive
departments and agencies shall not promote the sale or export of tobacco or tobacco
products....").

Id.
70 Exec. Order No. 13,194, 66 Fed. Reg. 7389 (Jan. 23, 2001) ("[T]he direct or indirect
69

importation into the United States of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone... is
prohibited.").
"' Exec. Order No. 13,196, 66 Fed. Reg. 7395 (Jan. 23, 2001) (establishing a permanent
Reserve Preservation Area in the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands).
72 Exec. Order No. 13,183, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,889 (Dec. 29, 2000) (creating a task force to
advance the executive branch's policy of answering questions regarding Puerto Rico's
future status, and explaining the process by which the determination of such status should be
accomplished).
13 Exec. Order No. 13,189, 66 Fed. Reg. 5421 (Jan. 19, 2001) (creating a task force to
assist the District of Columbia in "achieving financial stability, economic growth, and
improvement in managendnt and service delivery").
" Exec. Order No. 13,190, 66 Fed. Reg. 5424 (Jan. 19, 2001) (creating a commission to
analyze inequalities in educational resources).
" Exec. Order No. 13,186, 66 Fed. Reg. 3853, 3854 (Jan. 17, 2001).
76 Id. ("[T]he service shall develop a schedule for completion of the MOUs within 180
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Assuming that all of these orders were within the President's power, there is
no legal authority for invalidating an executive order merely because the
President issued it very late in his term. The timing of these orders does,
however, raise questions about their propriety. For example, in the last order
described above, the outgoing President directed numerous federal agencies to
undertake a two-year planning process, and instructed a lead agency to monitor
the performance of other agencies. Given the timing, little or no action in
response to this order was likely to occur before the new President assumed
office. There is no good reason, in the absence of an emergency, for a
President to initiate such a process so late in his term.
The orders establishing the task force on Puerto Rico and the Commission
on Educational Resource Equity suffer from similar apparent infirmities. The
problems involved in these orders did not suddenly materialize in the last days
or months of President Clinton's term, and it appears to constitute an abuse of
the presidency to establish mechanisms like these on the way out the door.
Perhaps if Vice President Gore had won the election and these orders were part
of a cooperative effort to achieve a seamless transition, these orders would not
be problematic. However, when the new President is likely to have a
significantly different regulatory agenda, the outgoing President should step
aside and allow the new President to govern, and should not waste government
77
assets in an obviously futile endeavor.
The question arises as to why President Clinton waited until the end of his
presidency to issue these orders. These orders are not different in kind from
actions he took throughout his presidency. There is no evidence that either
external forces or an overly complicated internal process delayed these matters.
The President does not fall under the APA's definition of "agency," and thus
does not have to comply with any of the APA's delay-producing procedural
requirements before issuing executive orders. 78 The question therefore seems
to be whether for some reason or combination of reasons the President waited
until the end of his term to issue these orders, or whether they are merely
instances of hurrying to accomplish more within the limit of the President's
term in office.
It is difficult to discern whether hurrying or waiting is the predominant
phenomenon here. Perhaps President Clinton (and Vice President Al Gore) did
not want to suffer the potential political heat generated by a set of anti-tobacco
days of this order.").
77 I do not mean to endorse the legitimacy of the procedure used for determining the
winner of the 2000 presidential election or to imply that the method of electing the President
of the United States is consistent with principles of democracy. See Ward Farnsworth, "To
Do a Great Right, Do a Little Wrong": A User's Guide to JudicialLawlessness, 86 MINN.
L. REV. 227 (2001) (evaluating whether the decision in Bush v. Gore can be defended on
extralegal grounds).
78 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992) (stating that the APA's
definition of agency does not include the President and that "textual silence is not enough to
subject the President to the provisions of the APA").
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and pro-environment actions, so he waited until after the election. However,
other issues covered in the late-term orders do not appear to be as
controversial, supporting the theory that President Clinton was hurrying to
finish before his term ended. For example, establishing a commission to study
educational resources is not the type of action likely to be costly in an election
year and thus the administration may have wanted to do this earlier but simply
did not get around to it. The task force on the District of Columbia had already
been in existence. The executive order merely formalized it. 79 The only
controversial element of these orders appears to be the timing--establishing
commissions and task forces in the last week or month of an administration
looks more like naked moves to exercise power over the successor
administration rather than legitimate attempts to deal with pressing problems.
The late-term executive orders, perhaps even more than late-term
regulations, appear designed in part to inflict political costs on the President's
successor. In many cases, the outgoing President should not expect that his
successor will actually implement or enforce the policies expressed in the lateterm executive orders, especially if the incoming President disagrees with
those policies. Procedurally, an incoming President is free to revoke prior
Presidents' executive orders. Politically, this freedom may not be a reality.
An incoming President can suffer serious political consequences by revoking
or amending executive orders. For example, if President Bush disagrees with
President Clinton's approach on promoting tobacco in foreign countries or
protecting migratory birds from harm by federal agencies, revoking or
watering down President Clinton's executive orders might provoke a public
outcry from the interests behind the orders. This may seem like a fair price for
a new President to pay to assume the reins of power, but not when the prior
President instituted the policy in the waning days of his administration. If the
issuing President's administration did not live under the executive order, why
should the successor's administration do so? If the matters covered by
President Clinton's late-term orders were so important, it is curious that they
were not important for nearly eight years of President Clinton's administration.
b.

Designationof NationalMonuments

Another set of late-term actions by President Clinton involved the
designation and expansion of national monuments. Under the Antiquities Act
of 1906, the President has the power to designate as national monuments areas
of federal land that contain "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest .... -80 In January
7 See Exec. Order No. 13189, 66 Fed. Reg. 5421 (Jan. 15, 2001).
0 Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (2000). For a general discussion of the
Act, see Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 GA. L.
REv. 473 (2003); see also Christine A. Klein, Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under
the Antiquities Act, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 1333, 1334-38 (2002) (arguing that Presidents have
used the Act to preserve much more land than Congress intended and that there have been
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2001, President Clinton designated several new national monuments and
expanded the boundaries of several existing monuments.81 Similar flurries of
national monument activity occurred in January, June, and November of 2000,
with almost no national monument activity in the earlier years of the Clinton
presidency. 82 Designation of federal land as a national monument generally
provides greater protection for that land than does simple status as part of a
national park or forest. This is because, in the Proclamation creating the
designation, the President has the power to specify what can or cannot be done
with the designated area. 83 The Antiquities Act does not address revocation of
such designations 84 and the Attorney General has interpreted this silence to
mean that only legislation can revoke the designations. 85 Designation can be
controversial because it may prevent activities such as grazing, logging,
mining, and oil drilling on federal land that previously may have been open to
such exploitation. 86 Compared with other Presidents, President Clinton was
relatively active in designating and expanding national monuments, but almost

all of this activity occurred near the end of his time in office. 87 The question
thus arises why he waited until the last year and even the last month of his
administration to make so many of these designations. In the terms used in this
article, was this an instance of hurrying, delay, or waiting?
long, bitter fights over designations).
81 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7393, 66 Fed. Reg. 7339 (Jan. 17, 2001) (establishing
Carrizo Plain National Monument); Proclamation No. 7392, 66 Fed. Reg. 7335 (Jan. 17,
2001) (enlarging the Buck Island Reef National Monument).
82 President Clinton's only national monument action before 2000 was the designation of
the Grand Staircase National Monument in 1996. See Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg.
50,223 (Sept. 24, 1996).
83 For example, on President Clinton's last day in office, he created the Sonoran Desert
National Monument. See Proclamation No. 7397, 66 Fed. Reg. 7354 (Jan. 17, 2001). In
creating the monument, President Clinton specified that,
grazing permits on Federal lands within the monument south of Interstate Highway 8
shall not be renewed at the end of their current term; and provided further, that grazing
on Federal lands north of Interstate 8 shall be allowed to continue only to the extent
that the Bureau of Land Management determines that grazing is compatible with the
paramount purpose of protecting the objects identified in this proclamation.
Id. at 7356.
84 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433.
85 See 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 185, 188 (1938) (concluding that the President does not have
"the power to abolish a monument entirely"). Critics have challenged some designations as
beyond the authority granted to the President by the Antiquities Act. Despite good
arguments that some designations go beyond the purpose of the Act, these challenges have
not succeeded. See Klein, supra note 80, at 1363-65.
86 Designation transfers management of the land to the National Park Service, an agency
within the Department of the Interior, whose express purpose is to conserve the land under
its control. See Klein, supra note 80, at 1361.
87 See Squillace, supra note 80, at 475 (characterizing the number and size of the
monuments designated by President Clinton as "remarkable").
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The most obvious candidate would appear to be waiting. Perhaps President
Clinton believed that the political costs of designating national monuments
were greater than the benefits. His first designation-Utah's Grand StaircaseEscalante National Monument in 1996-was controversial because some felt it
was a threat to ranching and mining interests. 88 Political forces, including
governors and federal legislators in states with potential monuments, appear to
have lined up against designations, perhaps because designation reduces
flexibility in the use of the land in question. 89 On the other side,
environmentalists pushed for more designations and for the creation of
"wilderness areas," which protect land even more than designating it as a
national monument. 90 Perhaps President Clinton decided that his best option
was to wait until the end of his term neared to make the remainder of his
designations in order to avoid the political fallout.
Another reason why waiting is a likely candidate is that the areas eligible for
designation as national monuments are already under federal control, reducing
the need for quick action. The President might not be able to protect his
chosen areas from all exploitation, but he can at least influence agencies such
as the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service to reduce the
exploitation of the lands as far as possible within legal limits. The
designations have their greatest effect after the transition, when a new
President is powerless to revoke the designation without cooperation from
Congress. 9 1 Because the President's successor cannot unilaterally revoke such
designations, this action seems to be a good candidate for a President who
wants to extend his influence beyond his term in office. A President's policy
in favor of designating national monuments is likely to bear fruit well beyond
that President's term. Subsequent administrations could neglect national
monuments, the same as they can subvert the effectiveness of midnight
regulations by failing to enforce them vigorously. However, the designation is
there to stay and, in most instances, it is likely to be honored, even by
administrations with less enthusiasm for the designation.
Additionally, some of President Clinton's designations may have been timed
with the election prospects of his Vice President in mind. While President
Clinton designated or expanded many national monuments after the 2000
88 See Judith Graham, U.S. Land Protection Plans Are Monumental If Congress Doesn't

Act to Preserve Millions ofAcres, The AdministrationLikely Will Designate Up to a Dozen
ProtectedAreas of a New Type, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18, 2000, at 3 (News) (describing protests
of ranching and mining industries at the time of the designation).
19 See Christopher Smith, Grand StaircaseNationalMonument: It's a New Name but an

Old Idea, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 6, 1996, at Al (reporting on the anger of U.S. Senators
Orrin Hatch and Bob Bennett over designation of monument).
90 See Tom Uhlenbrock, Acres of Controversy; President Clinton's Decision to
Designate 1.7 Million Acres of Utah Wilderness as a National Monument Has Angered the
Natives, ST. Louis POST-DSPATCH, Oct. 17, 1996, at 1G ("Environmentalists want the
monument's best spots to remain pristine ... ").
91 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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election, he designated a significant number before the election, and some were
92
even announced by Vice President Gore, a presidential candidate at the time.
This indicates that at least the Vice President thought that his election bid
would be helped by the designation of national monuments. This would
explain why the President timed so many designations for the period from
January through July of 2000, during the 2000 presidential election campaign.
However, this does not explain why many designations occurred after the
election. Perhaps the administration decided that too many designations, or at
least certain designations, would harm the Vice President's prospects. The
timing of two particular designations on November 9, 2000, just two days after
the presidential election, 93 may indicate that President Clinton was waiting out
of concern for Vice President Gore's prospects. However, it is also possible
that the administration simply may not have finished working on the
designations before the election and hurried to complete them before the end of
the term.
Another possible reason for waiting is that the President may not have
viewed the designations as very important in the context of all of the other
activities he spent time on during his term. Perhaps the President believed it
was more important to attend to other matters, choosing to leave most national
monument designations until the end of the term. This is also consistent with
the notion that some hurrying occurred-once more important matters were
attended to, the administration might have decided to see how many national
monument designations it could squeeze in under the wire.
It may also be the case that once President Clinton decided to begin making
monument designations, the process of designation resulted in some delay that
prevented President Clinton from making all his designations before the 2000
election. It is unlikely, however, that the delay was so great that he could not
have made a substantial number of designations before the last year of his
presidency.
Interest groups certainly lobbied the President concerning
monument designation, with environmental and preservation interests pushing
for designations and logging, oil, and perhaps ranching interests pushing
against. Each side may have had allies within the executive branch.
There have also historically been turf wars between officials in the
Department of Interior and Department of Agriculture concerning which
agency would manage certain national monuments carved out of lands already
controlled by federal agencies, such as the Forest Service in the Department of
Agriculture. 94 The Department of Agriculture's mission involves the

92

E.g., Press Release, The White House, Vice President Gore Announces New National

Monuments in Washington and Oregon (June 9, 2000), available at 2000 WL 764841.
93

Proclamation No. 7374, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,227 (Nov. 15, 2000) (creating the Vermillion

Cliffs National Monument); Proclamation No. 7373, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,221 (Nov. 15, 2000)
(expanding the Craters of the Moon National Monument).
14 There have been instances of dual management, in which the Department of Interior
manages the monument and the Department of Agriculture manages the surrounding forest
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exploitation of federal lands through logging and grazing.95 The designation of
a national monument, however, places management of such lands in the hands
of the Department of the Interior, a department with a much more conservation
oriented mission. 96 The fighting, which resulted in a compromise under which
some monuments might be managed day-to-day by a designated agency under
the overall supervision of the Interior Department, 97 may have caused some
delay. However, it is still unlikely that this delay made it impossible for
President Clinton to make a substantial number of designations before the
eighth year of his presidency.
c.

PresidentialPardons

Another presidential power that President Clinton exercised near the end of
his term was the pardon power. Presidents have traditionally granted pardons
near the end of each year as a show of good will and forgiveness during the
"holiday season." 98 The process requires pardon and clemency seekers to
included within the monument boundaries. Squillace, supra note 80, at 529; accord id. at
528-33 (describing issues and procedures concerning which federal agency would manage
monuments); see also John D. Leshy, Shaping the West: The Role of the Executive Branch,
72 U. COLO. L. REV. 287, 306 (2001) (discussing whether the Park Service or Bureau of
Land Management would manage a particular monument).
95See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Mission of USDA Agencies and Offices, at
http://www.usda.gov/mission/miss-toc.htm (last accessed Oct. 23, 2003); see also U.S.
Department of Interior, U.S. Department of the Interior Mission Statement, at
http://www.doiu.nbc.gov/orientation/mission.cfm (last accessed Oct. 23, 2003).
96 See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (stating that the National Park Service shall "conserve the
scenery and the natural and historical objects and the wildlife" in national parks,
monuments, and reservations, and "provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner
and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations").
The Antiquities Act itself does not designate a particular agency to manage national
monuments. However, Executive Order 6166 places management of national monuments in
the Office of National Parks, Buildings, and Reservations within the Department of Interior.
Exec. Order No. 6166 (June 10, 1933), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.A. § 901 note
(West
1996),
available at http://www.archives.gov/federal register/codification/
executiveorder/06166.html (last accessed Oct. 23, 2003). There are various methods the
President can use to place management of a particular monument in another agency in the
Department of Interior, but it is unclear whether the President may place primary
responsibility for the management outside that department. See Squillace, supra note 80, at
527-33 (discussing the possibility of management of national monuments in different
agencies and outside the Department of Interior altogether).
97See Squillace, supra note 80, at 533 (reporting that one monument designated in the
last month of President Clinton's administration included the United States Forest Service,
an Agriculture agency, in the management plan); see also id. at 507-14 (describing
controversy, and litigation, over President Clinton's monument designations).
98See, e.g., James N. Thurman, Inside the Decline in Christmas Eve Clemency,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Dec. 24, 1999, at 3 (mentioning that previous Presidents have
exercised the pardon power on Christmas Eve).
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apply to the pardon attorney in the Department of Justice, who makes
recommendations to the Attorney General and ultimately the President. This
process may include input from prosecutors and law enforcement officials who
participated in the process that led to the conviction. In one recent case, for
example, the Securities and Exchange Commission lobbied against a pardon
for Michael Milken, who had been convicted of securities fraud for his junk
bond dealings which cost investors over one-billion dollars. 99
President Clinton apparently exercised this power in the usual annual way
less frequently than his five predecessors, 100 but he made up for it at the end of
his term. President Clinton exercised his pardon power 176 times on his last
day in office, January 20, 2001. 10 This total includes 140 pardons and 36
clemency grants in which President Clinton reduced the sentences of federal
prisoners. 0 2
President Clinton had already begun issuing pardons in
December 2000, issuing approximately 60 pardons in that month for a total of
approximately 236 uses of the pardon power in the last two months of his
presidency.
The large number of end-of-term pardons makes it appear as if President
Clinton waited to exercise the pardon power until he was about to leave office
so he would not bear the political consequences of the pardons. Certain factors
in addition to timing support this inference. One explanation for President
Clinton's relatively sparing use of the pardon power was that, due to "longer
incarcerations and a 'get tough' mentality[,] presidents of both parties have
been using this power less frequently."'' 0 3 By delaying the remainder of his
pardon activity until just before the end of his term, President Clinton would
not have to buck this trend until it was too late for him to suffer any negative

99 See Michael Liedtke, Investors Hop on Leap Frog's IPO, AP ONLINE, July 25, 2002,

available at 2002 WL 24648758 ("When Milken's supporters unsuccessfully sought a
pardon during President Clinton's final days in office in 2001, the SEC objected stridently.
'Few people have done more than Milken to undermine public confidence in our markets,'
Richard Walker, the SEC's enforcement director, wrote in a letter to the White House.").
00 Thurman, supra note 98, at 3 ("In fact, Clinton has granted fewer pardons than any of
the five presidents since Richard Nixon.").
101 Jurist

Legal

Intelligence,

Clinton

Pardon

Grants,

January

2001,

at

http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pardons6a.htm (last accessed Nov. 13, 2003) (providing an
individualized list of each of the 141 pardons President Clinton granted during the last
month of his term); see Amy Goldstein & Susan Schmidt, Clinton's Last-Day Clemency
Benefits 176; List Includes Pardonsfor Cisneros, McDougal, Deutch and Roger Clinton,
WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2001, at Al ("Just two hours before surrendering the White House,
President Clinton gave parting gifts that lifted 176 Americans out of legal trouble ....).
'02 Goldstein & Schmidt, supra note 101 (providing the exact number of pardons and
prison sentence commutations); see Jurist Legal Intelligence, supra note 101; Jurist Legal
Intelligence,

Clinton Commutation Grants, January 2001, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/

pardons6b.htm (last accessed Nov. 13, 2003) (listing each of the thirty-six commutations
granted by President Clinton during the last month of his term).
'03Thurman, supra note 98, at 3.
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political consequences.
Another factor in favor of the waiting hypothesis is that President Clinton
granted two of his most noteworthy pardons at the end of his term: the pardons
of Mark Rich and Patty Hearst. Most uses of the pardon power are relatively
routine, involving a commutation or pardon for a sympathetic but unknown
convict. However, the pardons of Mark Rich and Patty Hearst did not fit this
mold. Mark Rich, a wealthy democratic financier, was a fugitive from justice
living overseas to avoid prosecution for tax evasion, fraud, and illegal oil
dealings with Iran. 10 4 The Rich pardon was viewed as extraordinary when
Clinton granted it because Rich had evaded prosecution and because his
primary qualification for the pardon appeared to be that his wife had donated
large sums of money to Democratic Party causes.' 05 Patty Hearst is the
granddaughter of the late William Randolph Hearst, the media mogul. The
Symbionese Liberation Army, a revolutionary group, kidnapped her in 1974.
She subsequently participated in a bank robbery with the group, apparently of
her own free will, armed with a machine gun (which she did not use to escape
her kidnappers). 106 She claimed her participation in the robbery was
involuntary, but she was convicted and sentenced to seven years in federal
custody. 0 7 President Jimmy Carter commuted her sentence after two years
and then actively participated in the effort to convince President Clinton to
grant her the pardon that she ultimately won.108
President Clinton's most controversial pardon, however, occurred well
before the end-of-term rush. In September 1999, President Clinton granted
qualified clemency to eleven convicted and long-incarcerated Puerto Rican
nationalists (members of the group Armed Forces of National Liberation or

t04 Gary Fields, US Says Rich May Be Liablefor Back Taxes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2001,

at A3 (discussing the charges filed against Rich and his flight from the country).
'05 President Bush considered the possibility of revoking this pardon but decided against
it "to protect that privilege, not only for me but for future presidents, as well." John Riley,
Bush Won't Revoke Pardon of Financier,NEWSDAY, at A14 (Jan. 30, 2001). Apparently,

there was a suggestion that the pardon might be revocable because the paperwork was not
complete or served when President Clinton left office. Id. If officials had not delivered the
pardon by the time President Clinton left office, then under some old precedent, President
Bush might have had sufficient grounds to revoke the pardon. See Harold J. Krent,
Conditioning the President's Conditional Pardon Power, 89

CAL.

L.

REV.

1665, 1704

(2001) (discussing In re De Puy, 7 F. Cas. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1869) (No. 3814), which held that
a pardon is not valid until delivery).
106

Say Goodbye to Tania: Patty Hearst PardonDeserved, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 5, 2001,

at 9, available at 2001 WL 6918502 (describing circumstances of Hearst's kidnapping and
later crime).
107 Id. ("Jurors rejected [Hearst's] brainwash defense and handed her seven years in
prison.").
.08
See Griffin Bell, Clinton to Wealthy: Flee the Country if Arrest Looms, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 31, 2001, at A20 ("President Carter did not pardon Ms. Hearst, but he worked hard to
persuade his successors to do so .... ").
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"FALN"), jailed for offenses called acts of terrorism. 10 9 He did not pardon
them, but he offered a restoration of their freedom and civil rights if they
pledged not to advocate violence to separate Puerto Rico from the United
States and promised not to associate with others involved in such activity."10
At the time, this action provoked an uproar based on the view that the convicts
did not deserve clemency and suspicions that President Clinton made the offer
in an effort to help his wife's U.S. Senatorial campaign in New York, which
has a substantial Puerto Rican population. II
The timing of this grant of clemency certainly supports the notion that
President Clinton acted to help his wife's election campaign. Considering that
President Clinton had not been generous in granting pardons, it is interesting
that he found a group of reputed terrorists more deserving of clemency than the
hundreds of others who had applied for clemency and were denied. From
information revealed in a (partisan) congressional investigation that occurred
after Clinton granted this pardon, it appears that the FALN clemency was
112
extraordinary both as a matter of process and as a matter of substance.
Perhaps President Clinton found that the gains from this particular grant of
clemency outweighed the potential losses, unlike the bulk of his planned
pardons and clemencies, which he waited until the end of his term to grant.
d.

Other PresidentialActions

An outgoing President can also engage in diplomatic activity with long
lasting effects on government policy. 1 3 These activities can be formal and
informal. For example, the President alone has the power to recognize foreign
governments, and theoretically a President could recognize a foreign

109 Ellen Yan, GOP Senators Assail Clemency Justice Department Faulted in FALN
Case, NEWSDAY, Oct. 21, 1999, at A18, available at 1999 WL 8193960 ("Republicans have
charged that Clinton granted clemency to terrorists.").
110 Shannon McCaffrey, House Panel Demands FALN Prisoners' Records, CHI. SUNTIMES, Sept. 2, 1999, at 3, available at 1999 WL 6555056 ("Clinton offered immediate
freedom ... in exchange for renunciations of violence ....
).
...Mimi Hall, Other Clinton Clemency Cases Dodge Controversy, USA TODAY, Sept.
27, 1999, at 8A, available at 1999 WL 6855907 ("Some critics question whether [President

Clinton] was trying to help first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton win Puerto Rican votes in her
bid for a U.S. Senate seat in New York.").
112 See THE

FALN

AND MACHETEROS CLEMENCY:

MISLEADING

EXPLANATIONS,

A

RECKLESS DECISION, A DANGEROUS MESSAGE, H.R. REP. No. 106-488, at 72-85 (1999)

(explaining that the FALN members were strange candidates for clemency because they
were convicted of violent crimes, their sentences were not disproportionate to the crimes,
and the members did not show remorse for committing the crimes).
I3 For an interesting study of the President's foreign affairs powers, see Saikrishna B.
Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, Ill YALE L.J.
231 (2001) (presenting the allocation of foreign affairs powers in the framework of the text
of the Constitution).
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government in the last days of his administration. 14 An outgoing President
could also sign treaties and executive agreements1 15 in the waning days of an
administration, and could engage in negotiations and other maneuvers that
could create expectations among allies and adversaries. Treaties require
Senate ratification, 1 6 so the President may not act unilaterally, and the long
and often difficult process of securing Senate agreement creates a strong
disincentive for waiting until the end of an administration to sign treaties.
Executive agreements, however, do not go through any process of ratification,
so a President could sign them very late in the term and leave them to the
succeeding administration to implement." 17 However, it appears that outgoing
Presidents rarely enter into international agreements of any kind at the very
end of their terms without the concurrence of the incoming administration,
largely because foreign leaders begin to look to the incoming President as the
authoritative voice of the nation immediately after the election. "18
114

The Constitution grants the President the power to "receive Ambassadors and other

public Ministers." U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 3. This has been interpreted to recognize the
President as the sole decisionmaker regarding recognition of foreign governments. See
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (dismissing a complaint against President Carter
for terminating a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan when President Carter decided to
recognize the government of the People's Republic of China).
115 Although the Constitution does not mention executive agreements, they are a
recognized instrument of foreign relations. Executive agreements are agreements made by
the President with a foreign power but not submitted to the Senate for ratification.
Executive agreements therefore do not have the legal status as treaties, and their true legal
status remains somewhat unclear. See Kenneth C. Randall, The Treaty Power, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1089, 1091 (1990); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 761-62 (2001). For a
comprehensive study of executive agreements in the United States, see FRANZISKA HELMBUSCH, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IM US-AMERIKANISCHEN VERFASSUNGSRECHT:

WEITE

PRASIDIALKOMPETENZEN IN DER AUSWARTIGEN GEWALT (1995). There is also a category of
executive agreements that the President negotiates under authority granted by Congress,
under the condition that the President submit the agreement to both Houses of Congress for
approval. This is a means for Congress, especially the House of Representatives, to assume
power in the foreign relations area that the Constitution does not appear to grant.
..
6 U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring a two-thirds majority of Senate to ratify
treaties).
..
7 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
"'I See Nancy Amoury Combs, Carter,Reagan, and Khomeini: PresidentialTransitions
and InternationalLaw, 53 HAST. L.J. 303, 305, 335 (2001). Combs's article discusses one
significant exception to the general lack of late-term presidential diplomatic activity, the
Carter administration's agreement to the Algiers Declarations that resolved the hostage
crisis that arose out of the seizure of the United States embassy in Tehran and the taking of
hostages by Iranian militants in 1979. The Declarations were agreed to and the hostages
were released on President Carter's last full day in office. Id. at 306. Combs reports that
the Iranian government agreed to the Declarations after Ronald Reagan was elected to
replace President Carter at least in part because it feared that, as President, Reagan would
deal with them much more harshly than President Carter. President Reagan, for his part,
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Finalized executive agreements and less formal diplomatic initiatives taken
late in an administration could put an incoming President who disagrees with
them in a difficult position. Even though the new President may have the raw
power to renounce an executive agreement signed by his predecessor, such an
action can make the negotiation of future agreements more difficult, and may
in some cases violate international law. The same is true with less formal
initiatives. It would harm the United States' ability to engage in diplomatic
initiatives if other countries perceived the United States as an unreliable
partner or expected radical changes with each change of administration.
D.

Summary

In sum, outgoing Presidents retain all of the powers of the presidency until
the new President's inauguration, and they often exercise those powers up to
the very last moment. There are different explanations for why so much
administrative and presidential activity occurs very late in the President's tenn.
Sometimes, Presidents and administrations may be hurrying to do as much as
possible in the limited time remaining, and the pace naturally increases as the
end draws near. Sometimes, action might occur late in the term due to delay
by external forces. Sometimes, Presidents and their administrations may have
reasons for waiting until very late in the term to take controversial action.
Often, these phenomena combine to push action toward the end of the term.
Although there are reasons to be suspicious of many late-term presidential and
administrative actions, it is impossible to draw firm general conclusions
regarding the propriety of late-term action. Rather, any evaluation must look
at the particular action and the reasons why the President waited so long to
take the action.
11.

WHAT CAN THE NEW PRESIDENT Do?

I turn now to the variety of strategies available to incoming Presidents for
dealing with the phenomenon of "midnight regulations," including some used
in recent years. In some cases, the incoming President will find it relatively
easy to avoid the effect of late-term action by the former President. In other
cases, it will be difficult for an incoming President to reverse what his
predecessor did on the way out of office.
A.

Legislative Rules: Delay, Rescission, Amendment, Rejection, Freeze

The simplest tactic an incoming administration can employ with regard to
midnight regulations is to delay, rescind, or amend them. Procedurally, the
administration cannot revoke a rule issued pursuant to notice and comment

considered repudiating the Declarations but he ultimately decided to honor them because
they advanced the interests of the United States. He did, however, implement them in a
manner designed to minimize the effect of those aspects of the Declarations with which he
disagreed. Id. at 343-52.
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rulemaking without undertaking a new notice and comment procedure.' 19 A
brief delay in a rule's effective date, as ordered by President Bush when he
took office, can probably be accomplished without notice and comment
procedures, but these procedures may be required for a substantial or indefinite
delay. 120 While the impetus for the action would come from the President, the
agency to which Congress delegated the rulemaking power at issue would
conduct the actual proceeding resulting in delay, rescission, or amendment.
The President might, for example, order the Administrator of the EPA to
rescind a regulation that was put into effect in the weeks before the transition.
At the outset of the administration, the Administrator is very likely to comply,
since the President probably explored the idea of compliance with this order, or
at least general agreement with the President's regulatory agenda, with the
Administrator before the appointment was made. The President's involvement
should not affect the validity of any subsequent rulemaking, assuming it is
12 1
conducted properly and has the requisite support in the record.
119 Sometimes notice and comment is used to promulgate rules where notice and

comment is not required. In such cases, there is a good argument that a new administration
ought to be able to revoke or revise the rule without employing notice and comment. In
short, an agency's choice to use more procedure than is statutorily required should not bind
subsequent administrations. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
120 As noted, section 553(b) of the APA exempts several categories and kinds of agency
action from its notice and comment requirements. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000); see also supra
notes 48-50 and accompanying text. The Bush administration invoked that section's
exemptions for procedural rules and for rules where there is good cause, including
impracticability, for dispensing with notice and comment on its decisions to delay for sixty
days the effective date of rules that had been issued but had not yet gone into effect. See
infra note 132. One commentator has concluded that a delay in the effective date of a rule
can itself be a rule presumptively subject to notice and comment rulemaking. See Jack,
supra note 6, at 1505-11. However, Jack also concluded that a brief delay may be exempt
from notice and comment as a procedural rule because a brief delay does not substantially
affect the rights and interests of private parties. See id. at 1505-06 nn.137-44.
The "good cause" provision of section 553 should also support the sixty day delays. An
incoming administration may have genuine concerns about the quality of last-minute
regulations given their quantity and the apparent urgency with which they seem to be
passed. Further, the impracticability of holding notice and comment before the impending
effective dates provides an additional basis for failing to provide notice and comment for the
delays. But see id at 1509 (concluding that agencies could have held notice and comment
before delaying effective dates). In addition, Jack reasoned that a lengthy or indefinite delay
in the effective date of a rule should normally be subjected to a notice and comment
procedure because it substantially affects parties interested in the rule. See id. at 1506-07.
The Bush administration essentially followed this line of reasoning. It ordered sixty day
delays without notice and comment, but when an agency sought to extend that delay, for
example when the EPA sought an additional nine month delay to study the arsenic in
drinking water rule, it conducted a brief notice and comment rulemaking before issuing the
second delay. See infra notes 145-150 and accompanying text.
121 See infra text accompanying notes 178-189.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 83:947

As a substantive matter, rules rescinding or amending other rules must meet
the standard of review applicable to rules made under the particular statute
involved. 122 In the Airbags Case, it was argued that judicial review of a
decision to rescind a rule should be very deferential because it resembles a
decision not to regulate more than a decision to impose a new rule, but the
Supreme Court rejected that argument.1 23 Rather, the Court reviewed the
Reagan administration's decision to rescind a Carter administration rule
requiring cars to be equipped with airbags under the arbitrary and capricious
test that applies to rules issued after notice and comment. 24 The most
important point about this case for present purposes is that the Court took the
regulatory status quo as the baseline and reviewed whether the new
25
administration had articulated a sufficient justification for making a change.1
This means that prior administrative action can tie a new President's hands
more than if the President had to worry only about whether administrative
action complies with applicable statutes.
Another action an incoming administration can take if there is time is to
urge Congress to use its power to pass legislation rejecting a rule, as Congress
did with regard to the ergonomics rule issued late in the Clinton
administration. 126 The new President can promise to sign such legislation, and
can also use his political clout to help get it passed. This procedure will work
only with rules that were promulgated late enough in the outgoing President's
122

See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41

(1983) [hereinafter Airbags Case] (stating that the procedural and judicial review provisions
of the APA apply to orders establishing, amending, or revoking standards under the
National Traffic and Motor Safety Act because the Act does not suggest a "difference in the
scope of judicial review depending upon the nature of the agency's action"). An order
briefly delaying the effective date of a rule is unlikely to be tested on judicial review
because, unless there is an emergency, any petition for review will not be heard until after
the brief delay has expired and the rule has either gone into effect or has been delayed
further pursuant to a notice and comment procedure. If the delay becomes lengthy or
indefinite, then it might be reviewed and the review would be similar to the review of a
decision to rescind a rule.
123See id. at 40-44 (reviewing, under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the
revocation of a rule requiring cars to be equipped with airbags). While the Carter
administration's rule could not be termed a "midnight regulation" since it was issued in the
first year of President Carter's term, the Reagan administration's unsuccessful attempt to
rescind it raises many of the same issues that are involved when an administration attacks
rules promulgated late in the prior administration's term.
124 See id. at 43 (holding that the arbitrary and capricious standard applies to rescission
and modifications of previously issued rules); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) ("The reviewing court shall.., hold unlawful and set aside
agency actions, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law .....
125 See Airbags Case, 463 U.S. at 43.
126 Ergonomics Rule Disapproval, Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001) (repealing the
ergonomics rule).
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term so that, by the time Congress acts on them, the new President is in office
to sign the legislation. With regard to rules promulgated earlier, the former
President would still be in office and could veto the legislation rejecting the
rule. Later, however, Congress could still pass legislation to effectively
override the rule. The expedited procedures of the Congressional Review Act
would not apply, and it might be more difficult to get the legislation through
both Houses of Congress. After the time allowed for quick legislative action
expires, it might be easier for the new administration to employ rulemaking to

revise or revoke the rule than to convince Congress to make a legislative
change.
Presidents Reagan, Clinton, and George W. Bush took action aimed
specifically at midnight regulations. For example, shortly after President
George W. Bush took office, his Chief of Staff conveyed by memorandum an
order from the President directing agencies to take, inter alia, the following
steps: 1) not to send any proposed or final regulation to the Federal Register
unless the proposed or final regulation has been reviewed by an agency head
appointed by President Bush; 2) to withdraw any regulations that have been
submitted to the Federal Register, but not yet published, so that they can be so
reviewed; and 3) to postpone the effective date of published, but not yet
effective, regulations for sixty days.1 27 The reason offered for these actions

127

The memorandum, published at 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, reads as follows:

MEMORANDUM
January 20, 2001
Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
FROM:

Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Assistant to the Presidentand Chief of Staff

SUBJECT:

Regulatory Review Plan.

The President has asked me to communicate to each of you his plan for managing the
Federal regulatory process at the outset of his Administration. In order to ensure that
the President's appointees have the opportunity to review any new or pending
regulations, I ask on behalf of the President that you immediately take the following
steps:
1. Subject to any exceptions the Director or Acting Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (the "OMB Director") allows for emergency or other urgent
situations relating to health and safety, send no proposed or final regulation to the
Office of the Federal Register (the "OFR") unless and until a department or agency
head appointed by the President after noon on January 20, 2001, reviews and approves
the regulatory action. The department or agency head may delegate this power of
review and approval to any other person so appointed by the President, consistent with
applicable law.
2. With respect to regulations that have been sent to the OFR but not published in the
Federal Register, withdraw them from OFR for review and approval as described in
paragraph 1, subject to exception as described in paragraph 1. This withdrawal must be
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was to provide the new administration with a chance to review these
28
regulations before putting them into effect.
The process of complying with the Bush administration's order and
reviewing late-term actions by the Clinton administration occupied a great deal
of agency officials' time and energy in the early days of the administration. 29
In the weeks and months after the review memorandum was issued, agency
heads complied by issuing orders postponing the effective dates of regulations
that had been finalized in the weeks before the transition so that the regulations

conducted consistent with the OFR procedures.
3. With respect to regulations that have been published in the OFR but have not taken
effect, temporarily postpone the effective date of the regulations for 60 days, subject to
exception as described in paragraph 1.
4. Exclude from the requested actions in paragraphs 1-3 any regulations promulgated
pursuant to statutory or judicial deadlines and identify such exclusions to the OMB
Director as soon as possible.
5. Notify the OMB Director promptly of any regulations that, in your view, impact
critical health and safety functions of the agency and therefore should be also excluded
from the directives in paragraphs 1-3. The Director will review any such notifications
and determine whether exception is appropriate under the circumstances.
6. Continue in all instances to comply with Executive Order 12866, pending our
review of that order, as well as any other applicable Executive Orders concerning
regulatory management.
As used in this memorandum, "regulation" has the meaning set out in section 3(e) of
Executive Order 12866. That is, this plan covers "any substantive action by an agency
(normally published in the Federal Register) that promulgates or is expected to lead to
the promulgation of a final rule or regulation, including notices of inquiry, advance
notices of proposed rulemaking, and notices of proposed rulemaking."
This regulatory review will be implemented by the Director or Acting Director of the
OMB. Communications regarding exceptions to the review, or questions regarding the
review generally, should be addressed to that individual.
Finally, in the interest of sound regulatory practice and the avoidance of costly,
burdensome, or unnecessary regulation, independent agencies are encouraged to
participate voluntarily in this review.
This memorandum shall be published in the Federal Register.
Card Memorandum, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 20, 2001).
"8 See id. President Clinton's administration took a very similar step on January 22,
1993 in a notice issued by OMB. See Regulatory Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 6074 (Jan. 25,
1993) (requesting that agencies not send proposed and final rules to the Federal Register for
publication until approved by an agency head or other Clinton appointee). Unlike President
Bush, President Clinton did not suspend the effective date of already-published regulations.
Rather, he ordered agencies not to publish any new regulations until a Clinton-appointee had
a chance to review and approve them. Id.
29 For information on the number of rules affected by the Bush administration order and
what ultimately happened to those rules, see Jack, supra note 6, at 1484-88 (reporting that
agencies withdrew 124 regulations, 40 of them final rules, between January 21, 2001 and
early February 2001 and delayed 90 rules during the same period).
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could be reviewed by Bush administration officials. 30 In at least one case, an
agency mistakenly issued a rule after President Bush's order and the agency
then had to issue a notice withdrawing the rule pending administration
review. 131 The orders delaying the effective dates of regulations were all
issued by the officials with authority over the particular area, all relied on the
President's memorandum, and all recited reasons why the delay order was
proper without notice and comment rulemaking under the APA. 132 One of the
reasons for ordering the delay without a notice and comment period is that
delaying the effectiveness of the order to accommodate notice and comment
would mean that the order would not become final until after the delayed
regulation had gone into effect. 133 This rendered notice and comment,
according to the relevant agencies, impractical and contrary to the public
34
interest.1

130 In the first few months of the Bush administration, agencies issued more than seventy
notices delaying the effectiveness of rules that had been published in the waning days of the
Clinton administration but had not yet become effective. See, e.g., Special Regulations:
Areas of the National Park System: Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 8366 (Jan. 31,
2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7) (delaying for sixty days the effective date of the rule
concerning the restrictions on snowmobiles and other winter activities in Yellowstone and
Grand Teton National Parks and the John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Memorial Parkway);
Mitigation of Impacts to Wetlands and Natural Habitat, 66 Fed. Reg. 8089 (Jan. 29, 2001)
(to be codified at 23 C.F.R. pt. 777) (delaying for sixty days the effective date of the rule
concerning the mitigation of impacts to wetlands and natural habitat).
131Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS);
Methodology for Coverage of Phase 1I and Phase Ill Clinical Trials Sponsored by the
National Institutes of Health, 66 Fed. Reg. 9199 (Feb. 7, 2001) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R.
pt. 199) (withdrawing the rule published by the Department of Defense, which was
published contrary to the provisions of the Card Memorandum).
132The justification for dispensing with notice and comment rulemaking in each of the
notices was as follows, with some minor variations among the rules:
To the extent that 5 U.S.C. section 553 applies to this action, it is exempt from notice
and comment because it constitutes a rule of procedure under 5 U.S.C. section
Alternatively, the Agency's implementation of this rule without
553(b)(A).
opportunity for public comment, effective immediately upon publication today in the
Federal Register, is based on the good cause exceptions in 5 U.S.C. section 553(b)(B)
and 553(d)(3), in that seeking public comment is impracticable, unnecessary and
contrary to the public interest. The temporary 60-day delay in effective date is
necessary to give Department officials the opportunity for further review and
consideration of new regulations, consistent with the Assistant to the President's
memorandum of January 20, 2001. Given the imminence of the effective date, seeking
prior public comment on this temporary delay would have been impractical, as sell
[sic] as contrary to the public interest in the orderly promulgation and implementation
of regulations.
Special Regulations; Areas of the Nat'l Park System: Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg.
at 8367.
1 Mitigation of Impacts to Wetlands and Natural Habitat, 66 Fed. Reg. at 8089.
134 See, e.g., notice cited supra note 132. For an argument that some of the Bush
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The Bush administration's review of late-term Clinton regulations resulted
in some regulations going forward as originally issued, some regulations being
altered, some regulations being reviewed further, and some regulations being
scrapped. In some cases, the Bush administration's review of the regulation
was finished before the end of the sixty-day period of delay, and the agency
issued a notice declaring that, after review, the regulation would stand as
35
issued and would go into effect after the sixty-day period of delay was over.
Some of the delay orders provoked public comments urging the new
administration to abandon or alter the rule in question. Some of these efforts
1 37
were successful, 136 while others were not.
A closer look at two examples helps illustrate the process. On January 11,
2001, just over a week before the end of the Clinton administration, the
Department of Labor issued an interpretation of the "Advice" exemption in
38
section 203(c) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.'
The new interpretation narrowed the category of information exempted from
disclosure by employers. The Department found that the new interpretation
139
was a better reading of the text and intent of the Act than the 1962 version.
If an employer fails to provide required information, the Department of Labor
is statutorily authorized to bring a civil suit to compel production of the
information, and willful, knowing, or repeated violations are subject to
criminal penalties. 140 The previous interpretation had been in effect since
administration's actions violated APA procedural requirements and were arbitrary and
capricious, see Jack, supra note 6, at 1488-1511 (arguing that the withdrawal by the
Department of Defense of the final rule that had been already published in the Federal
Register violated the procedural requirements of the APA and that some of the delays made
pursuant to the Card Memorandum may not be considered procedural rules within the
meaning of the APA).
35 Contractor Legal Management Requirements; Department of Energy Acquisition
Regulation, 66 Fed. Reg. 19,717 (Apr. 17, 2001) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 719, 48
C.F.R. pts. 931, 970) (confirming, after the completion of the Department of Energy's
review, an effective date of April 23, 2001).
136 See PHS Policy on Instruction in the Responsible Conduct of Research, 66 Fed. Reg.
11,032 (Feb. 21, 2001) (indefinitely suspending Clinton-era regulation to permit additional
review both of the substance of the policy and the process for adoption).
137 See Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy; Energy Conservation
Program for Consumer Products: Clothes Washer Energy Conservation Standards, 66 Fed.
Reg. 19,714 (Apr. 17, 2001) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430) (denying the petitions for
reconsideration and confirming the new effective date after the Bush administration
reviewed the rules).
138Interpretation of the "Advice" Exemption in Section 203(c) of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 2782 (Jan. 11, 2001) (stating that the
application of the "advice" exemption depends on whether an activity can be considered
giving "advice," meaning an oral or written recommendation regarding a decision or a
course of conduct, as opposed to engaging in direct or indirect persuasion of employees).
139 See id. at 2785.
140See id. at 2782 (authorizing the Secretary of Labor to bring civil actions to enforce the
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1962. The Clinton administration's Department of Labor made this change
after operating under the longstanding prior interpretation for eight years and
knowing that the new interpretation would be enforced, if at all, by its
Republican successor.' 4' This scenario appears to be an effort not to influence
policy, but rather to score political points with friends and cause political
problems for the new administration. Pursuant to President Bush's order, on
February 9, 2001, the Department of Labor delayed the effective date of the
January 11 rule for sixty days. 142 Then, on April 11, 2001, the new effective
date for the 2001 interpretation, the Department rescinded the new
interpretation, thereby reinstating the 1962 interpretation.143 In support of this
decision, the Department stated that it was not persuaded that the new
interpretation was more consistent with the text and intent of the statute than
the 1962 version, and it was also troubled that the new interpretation had been
issued without notice and comment. 144
The second example involves the instance of the Bush administration's
review process that achieved the most notoriety, the process surrounding the
rule reducing the permissible level of arsenic in drinking water. On January
22, 2001, two days after President Bush was inaugurated, the EPA published a
final rule setting the permissible level of arsenic in drinking water. 145 On
reporting requirements of the LMRDA, in addition to the application of criminal sanctions
in cases of willful violations, knowingly false statements, and knowing failures to disclose a
material fact).
"41 The rule was prospective, taking effect thirty days after publication. Id. Thus, even
if
the Department of Labor was inclined to institute an enforcement action in the last days of
the Clinton administration, the new rule would not yet have been in effect.
142 Interpretation of the "Advice" Exemption in Section 203(c) of the Labor-Management

Reporting and Disclosure Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 9724 (Feb. 9, 2001) (temporarily delaying for
sixty days the enforcement date of the interpretation set forth by the outgoing Clinton
administration).
143 Interpretation of the "Advice" Exemption in Section 203(c) of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 18,864 (Apr. 11, 2001) (rescinding the Clinton
administration revision of the "advice" exemption of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act).
144See id.(stating that the evidence provided in support of a revised interpretation was
insufficient and the revision was made without consulting most affected parties). Notice
and comment is not required for an interpretative rule.
Interestingly, the Bush
administration did not request comments on whether the new interpretation should be
retained or abandoned. In its notice delaying the effective date of the rule, the Department
of Labor stated that, due to the President's order to delay the effective date, application of
the new interpretation "shall instead commence on April 11, 2001." See Interpretation of
the "Advice" Exemption in Section 203(c) of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, 66 Fed. Reg. at 9724.
145 National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976 (Jan. 22, 2001)
(to be codified in 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142) (establishing a health-based, non-enforceable
maximum contaminant level goal for arsenic of zero and an enforceable maximum
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March 23, 2001, the EPA, in accordance with the new President's order,
delayed the effective date of this rule for sixty days. 146 This generated a great
deal of public controversy. The next step taken by the new EPA Administrator
was to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to allow for a further delay of
nine months in order to study the arsenic issue.' 47 This notice raised the
possibility that the rule might be revised. Another EPA notice formally
148
adopted a further delay of the rule's effective date to allow for this study.
Then something somewhat unexpected occurred. In the midst of substantial
public controversy, a scientific report requested by the EPA as part of this
review process concluded that even the Clinton administration had
underestimated the negative health effects of arsenic. 149 This study supported
the Clinton administration's regulation, and on October 31, 2001, the Bush
administration's EPA Administrator announced that the Clinton standard
would go into effect as planned under the published schedule.'5 0
There are many additional "midnight regulations," issued across the range of
administrative agencies, that were reviewed in the early days of the Bush
administration. Many, like the arsenic rule discussed above, were allowed to
take effect after the review was completed. In these cases, the only legal
change the new administration made was to delay the rules' effective dates,
In other cases, after initial review, the Bush
usually by sixty days.
contaminant level for arsenic of 0.01 mg/L).
146 National

Primary

Drinking Water Regulations;

Arsenic

and Clarifications to

Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring: Delay of
Reg. 16,134 (Mar. 23, 2001) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141,
days the effective date of the rule on the permissible level of arsenic
147 National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic

Effective Date, 66 Fed.
142) (delaying for sixty
in drinking water).
and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 20,580 (April 23,
2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142) (proposing a nine month extension of the
effective date of the arsenic rule to complete the reassessment process of the science and
costing analyses and to provide an opportunity for further public input).

148 National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring: Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed.
Reg. 28,342 (May 22, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142) (extending for
nine months the effective date for the arsenic rule in order to conduct the reviews of the
science and costing analyses underlying the arsenic rule).
"'

See SUBCOMM. TO UPDATE THE 1999 ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER REPORT, ARSENIC

IN DRINKING WATER:

2001

UPDATE (National Academy

http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309076293/html/Rl.html

Press

2001), available at

(last accessed Nov. 13, 2003);

Deborah Schoch, Even Minute Levels of Arsenic Could Cause Cancer, Study Says, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at B I (reporting that National Academy of Sciences fully supported
Clinton administration rules); Bush Adopts Clinton Arsenic Standard, AP ONLINE, Oct. 31,
2001, available at 2001 WL 29789200.

151 See Press Release, EPA, EPA Announces Arsenic Standard for Drinking Water of 10
Parts per Billion (Oct. 31, 2001), available at 2001 WL 1337226 (reporting the EPA
Administrator's announcement that the agency will lower the maximum acceptable level of
arsenic in drinking water from fifty to ten parts per billion).
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administration proposed a new rule to replace the previously published rule,
and ordered a delay of the effective date of the Clinton-era rule until the new
rulemaking could be completed.' 5' This process would then result in the
adoption of a new rule in place of the Clinton administration's rule. 52 The
only controversial step here would be the additional delay in the effective date
of the Clinton administration's rule without notice and comment, which is
53
similar to actions the Clinton administration took eight years earlier.
The Bush administration's review process was designed to minimize the
legal challenges that might be raised against the process. After the President
ordered all agency departments to delay the effective dates of rules that had
been published, the actual orders to delay effective dates were issued by the
agencies themselves. These orders were all published in the Federal Register.
Then, if further delay was sought, the agencies set down the proposal for a
later effective date and for notice and comment. If the agency proposed
revising the Clinton-era rule, it put its own proposal out for notice and
comment, rather than merely re-writing or abandoning the rule based on the
record produced in the notice and comment period that was held during the
Clinton administration.
Compliance with some aspects of President Bush's order was less public
than others. President Bush ordered agencies and departments not to publish
any new rules (including proposed rules) until a Bush appointed agency head
had an opportunity to review the rule, and to withdraw any rules or rulemaking
proposals that had been submitted to the Federal Register but had not yet been
published. 154 It is unclear how many such rules there were, and because they
had not yet been published, no sign of them appears in the Federal Register
itself. Nor are there any documents in the Federal Register that reflect the
withdrawal of a submitted but unpublished rule or proposal, or a decision not
to publish a rule so as to comply with the order. There is at least one instance
in which a final rule was published in the Federal Register and then withdrawn
by the agency with the explanation that the publication of the final rule
violated President Bush's regulatory review plan. 155 This rule was published
'5' New Markets Venture Capital Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 20,531 (proposed Apr. 23,
2001) (proposing to withdraw the interim final rule before it became effective and to
implement the New Market Venture Capital Program Act with a new proposed rule).
152

New Markets Venture Capital Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,602 (May 23, 2001) (to be

codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 108) (withdrawing a previously published interim final rule and
issuing a new regulation to implement the New Market Venture Capital Program Act).
153The best example here is the seven-year suspension, without notice and comment, of
the "gag rule." See The Title X "Gag Rule", 58 Fed. Reg. 7455, 7455 (Jan. 22, 1993)
(authorizing the suspension of the "gag rule," which prevented recipients of Federal funding
for family planning clinics from providing their patients with information, counseling, or

referrals concerning abortion).
154 Card Memorandum, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001).
'55 Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS);
Methodology for Coverage of Phase I1 and Phase III Clinical Trials Sponsored by the
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on January 31, 2001, probably too late for it to have been submitted for
publication before January 20, when the transition occurred.15 6 Other than this
of final rules that had
instance, there is no evidence in the Federal Register
57
been submitted and then withdrawn for review.
The points of legal doubt in this process are: first, whether an agency has the
power, without notice and comment, to withdraw or delay the effective date of
rules, which had been adopted pursuant to notice and comment proceedings, to
allow the rules to be reconsidered; 158 second, whether the withdrawal or delay
was somehow more suspect because it was done under presidential order;
third, whether an agency decision not to publish a rule or proposed rule is
suspect if done under presidential compulsion; and fourth, whether any new
rulemaking would also be suspect because it was done under apparent
presidential compulsion. In my view, none of these factors are likely to result
in invalidation of any of the Bush administration's review-related actions.' 5 9
National Institutes of Health, 66 Fed. Reg. 9199 (Feb. 7, 2001) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R.
pt. 199) (withdrawing a final rule on Methodology for Coverage of Phase I1and Phase III
Clinical Trials, which was published in violation of the Card Memorandum).
156 Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS);
Methodology for Coverage of Phase It and Phase II Clinical Trials Sponsored by the
National Institutes of Health, 66 Fed. Reg. 8365 (Jan. 31, 2001) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R.
pt. 199) (issuing a final rule allowing the Department of Defense to waive a general
prohibition on coverage of unproven medical treatments in connection with clinical trials so
that covered beneficiaries can participate in selected trials involving cancer treatment and
prevention sponsored by the National Institutes of Health-National Cancer Institute). As far
as can be discerned by searching the Federal Register, this final rule remains withdrawn and
no substitute has been promulgated.
'57 According to one report, "agencies promptly responded to the directives of the Card
Memorandum and withdrew a total of 124 regulations, forty of them final rules, from the
[Office of the Federal Register's] 'publication queue' between January 21, 2001 and early

February 2001." Jack, supra note 6, at 1485-86. Jack concludes, based on the Federal
Register Act and regulations promulgated under it, that it is perfectly legal for an agency to
withdraw documents from the Federal Register before they have been published or made
available to the public through the Office of the Federal Register, although it may be
problematic once a document has been made available to the public, which occurs before
actual publication in the Federal Register. See id. at 1492-97; see also Kennecott Utah
Copper Corp. v. Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that an
agency has the power to withdraw a rule from the Federal Register before it has been made
public).
158 See Lars Noah, Doubts About Direct Final Rulemaking, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 401, 416
(1999) (arguing, in another context, that an agency may not, absent good cause, withdraw or
rescind a final rule without notice and comment). Professor Ronald Levin responds that in
some circumstances an agency may withdraw a final rule for reconsideration without
inviting public comments on the decision to reconsider. Ronald Levin, More on Direct
Final Rulemaking: Streamlining, Not Corner-Cutting,51 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 765 (1999).
159 At least one commentator has concluded that, while many of the incoming Bush
administration's actions were within the limits of the law, some of them raise serious legal
questions under the APA. See Jack, supra note 6, at 1490-1511. Specifically, Jack
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Some of these legal questions are unlikely to ever be resolved. With regard
to a short delay, unless there is such an emergency that a court could be
convinced to hear the case immediately, by the time any legal challenge to the
incoming administration's action reaches the merits, the period of delay is
likely to have long expired, and the issue will have either ripened into a
challenge to revocation or revision of the rule, or the rule will be in effect and
any challenge to the delay will have become moot.
With regard to an order not to promulgate any rules for a short period of
time to allow the new administration to assume the reins of power, assuming
that administrative officials cooperate with the President, it is also seems that
any challenge involving the President is likely to be moot by the time a case
could be litigated. The period during which agencies were directed not to issue
regulations was sixty days under both Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush.
The sixty days are likely to be long over by the time a court would reach the
merits of the President's suspension order. By then, the agency would have
decided either to go ahead and promulgate the rule, in which case the challenge
to the delay would likely be moot, or the agency might rescind or modify the
rule, in which case the only challenge would be to the rescission or revision
rather than the delay. In challenging the decision, the President's involvement
is likely to be irrelevant because the actual rescission or revocation would be
carried out by the person having the authority to take the action in question,
usually an agency head or department head. The decision would be judged on
its merits, i.e. whether all required procedures were observed and whether the
record was sufficient to warrant the decision based on the applicable standard
of review. Courts are likely to avoid the unsettled separation of powers
questions lurking when the claim is made that an administrative decision
should be invalidated because the President was too involved in taking an
action that Congress had delegated to a particular official in the executive
branch.
If a challenge to delay were presented in a justiciable form, and a court were
inclined to reach the merits, the incoming President would have strong
arguments supporting the legality of freezing the issuance of new rules and the
implementation of regulations promulgated at the end of a term. The
President's primary power and duty is to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."' 60
One need not be a believer in the unitary executive to
sympathize with an incoming administration that arrives to find hundreds or
concludes that the withdrawal of a final rule before publication in the Federal Register does
not violate the APA or any other statute or rule. Id. at 1494-95. However, his comment
does conclude that withdrawing a final, published rule without notice and comment violates
the procedural requirements of the APA and that, in some circumstances, delaying the
effective date of a rule, which was done many times under the Card Memorandum, violates
the APA. See id. at 1498-1511. As the discussion in text reveals, I do not believe that a
court would rule against the Bush administration if any of the actions under the Card
Memorandum provoked a justiciable controversy.
160 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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thousands of pages of new rules that were promulgated in the last days of the
prior administration. A brief delay in order to assess the rules seems to be a
reasonable use of the President's power. There would be legitimate concerns
that the rush at the end of a term produced ill-considered rules that may be
difficult to incorporate into the existing legal framework.
Looking at agency action apart from the Presidents' involvement, courts are
unlikely to overturn an agency's decision to delay briefly the effective date of a
new rule. Such a delay should be viewed as within an agency's power. Doubt
might increase as the suspension lengthens, however, prompting suspicion that
61
the suspension might be a cover for repeal without notice and comment.
The withdrawal of a final rule, which occurred in at least one case, is a bit
more problematic, but ultimately I do not believe that a court should interfere
with an agency decision to withdraw a rule shortly after publication but before
it becomes effective unless there are independent reasons for requiring the
agency to issue the rule.' 62 The President's involvement also should not
invalidate either the suspension or the results of any new rulemaking. As long
as the agency official with legal authority actually issues the relevant orders or
conducts the rulemaking, I do not see any legal basis for disallowing this
degree of involvement by the President in the administrative process.
Separation of powers concerns also counsel against restricting the President's
ability to guide activities within the executive branch.
B. . Nonlegislative Rules and Executive Orders
As noted above, there was no surge at the end of the Clinton presidency in
the issuance of interpretive rules although there appears to have been an
increase in some documents, such as guidances, that do not require notice and
comment proceedings. 63 The reason for this may be very simple: in general,
the APA requires the same process for revoking or revising a rule as is
followed in its adoption. Therefore, a new administration can revoke or
replace a prior administration's interpretive rules and policy statements simply
by publishing notice in the Federal Register. Because interpretive rules and
policy statements are not very durable, the outgoing administration may not
find it worthwhile to take the trouble to issue them just so the incoming
administration can revoke them a few days or weeks later.
Executive orders are also freely revocable and revisable by a subsequent
President. All an incoming President needs to do to revoke or revise an

161

Again, the best example is President Clinton's suspension of the "gag rule," which,

after a few years, might have been viewed as a repeal and thus may have been improper

without notice and comment. See The Title X "Gag Rule", 58 Fed. Reg. 7455, 7455 (Feb. 5,
1993) (suspending the "gag rule" that had prevented family planning clinics receiving
federal funds from providing their patients with information, counseling, or referrals
concerning abortion).
162See supra note 158.
163 See supra text

accompanying notes 58-59.
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executive order issued by his predecessor is issue a new executive order. As

noted above, President Clinton issued at least thirty-eight executive orders in
the last eight months of his presidency, including twenty-one that were issued
after the November election. President Bush's earliest executive orders
involved a new initiative and were not efforts to undo orders made by
President Clinton. 164 While several of President George W. Bush's early
executive orders revoked or revised orders issued by President Clinton, by and
large these did not involve orders issued by President Clinton late in his term.
The first Bush executive order that dealt with a late-term Clinton order
165
extended the reporting date of the task force on the future of Puerto Rico.
Another relatively early Bush order revised a 1999 executive order regarding
the welfare of Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders. 166 President Bush also
added to the restrictions on diamond imports from Sierra Leone that President
Clinton had imposed on January 18, 2001.167

Another order issued by

President Bush in his first year in office formalized the discontinuance of the
Commission on Improving Economic Opportunity in Communities Dependent
on Tobacco Production While Protecting Public Health-created by President
Clinton in September 2000-apparently on the ground that the commission
had completed its work. 168 In sum, although President Clinton issued more
164 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 31, 2001) (establishing a
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives responsible for developing
policies aimed at expanding the role and increasing the capacity of faith-based and other
community programs); Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 31, 2001)
(establishing Executive Department Centers for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives,
which is responsible for coordinating efforts to eliminate obstacles to the participation of
faith-based and other community organizations in the provision of social services).
165Exec. Order No. 13,209, 66 Fed. Reg. 22,105 (May 2, 2001) (extending by three
months the time in which the President's Task Force on Puerto Rico's Status was to report
to the President).
166Exec. Order No. 13,216, 66 Fed. Reg. 31,373 (June 11, 2001) (changing the title of
Executive Order 13,125 of June 7, 1999, and extending by two years the President's
Advisory Commission on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders).
167Exec. Order No. 13,213, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,829 (May 24, 2001) (prohibiting
importation into the United Sates of all rough diamonds that originated in Liberia and
authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to take any action necessary to carry out the
prohibition).
168Exec. Order No. 13,225, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,291 (Oct. 3, 2001) (prolonging the existence
of a number of listed advisory committees and revoking executive orders establishing
committees that had terminated or whose work was complete). This order revoked, inter
alia, Executive Order 13,168, which created the Commission on Improving Economic
Opportunity in Communities Dependent on Tobacco Production While Protecting Public
Health. Exec. Order No. 13,168, 65 Fed. Reg. 58,217 (Sept. 22, 2000). Executive Order
13,168 had already provided that the commission it created was to report to the President
sometime in mid-2001 and that it would go out of existence thereafter. Thus, it may be that
the commission had finished its work and that President Bush was merely formalizing its
end.
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executive orders in his last months in office than during similar periods in
other years, there is no indication that the new administration found it
necessary to revoke or revise the late-term Clinton executive orders.
There are probably a variety of explanations for this. First, because
executive orders are freely revocable and revisable, they may not be the
instrument of choice for "midnight regulation." They are simply not durable
enough to be worthwhile. Second, the subject matter of many executive orders
may not be important enough for the new President to deal with, even if he
never would have issued the order himself. For example, even if President
Bush never would have created the various task forces and commissions that
were established late in President Clinton's term, since President Bush was
free to ignore their reports and recommendations, it may not have been worth
the effort involved to disestablish these bodies, especially if doing so would
have created grumbling and thus entailed political costs, however small.
Finally, executive orders may be too public. In many situations, Presidents
might prefer to assert their authority more privately, taking the spotlight only
when there is an important political reason to do so.
Although it would seem that executive orders can be a useful instrument for
an administration in assuming the reins of power, they do not appear to be
widely used in that way. For example, when Presidents Bush and Clinton each
ordered a hold on new regulations that had been issued late in their
predecessor's terms, they did not do this via executive order. Rather, they had
69
other officials issue memoranda that were published in the Federal Register.
Further, when President Clinton ordered HHS to replace the gag rule, he did so
via a memorandum directed to the Secretary of HHS, not via an executive
order. 170 Perhaps the most well known use of the executive order to assert
power over the executive branch in the last few decades has been the issuance
of executive orders requiring centralized review of agency regulations by
OMB. About eight months after he took office, President Clinton revoked
President Reagan's precedent-setting regulatory review order and replaced it
with his own version.17' Other than this particular order, recent Presidents
have not used executive orders to establish authority early in their terms.
Interestingly, the executive order does not appear to be a major instrument for
midnight regulation or presidential consolidation of power over the executive
branch.

169 Card Memorandum, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 20, 2001); see also Regulatory

Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 6074 (Jan. 25, 1993).
170See The Title X "Gag Rule", 58 Fed. Reg. 7455, 7455 (Feb. 5, 1993) (memorandum
of President Clinton directing the Secretary of HHS to suspend the gag rule and propose
new regulations).
171See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (establishing a new

regulatory review system aimed at reforming the regulatory process to make it more
efficient).
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National Monuments and PresidentialPardons

There is little that an incoming President can do about an outgoing
President's use of authority under the Antiquities Act to designate areas of
federal land as national monuments. As explained above, the Antiquities Act
has been interpreted to make the President's designations final, subject only to
legislation by Congress. 172 The incoming President can, however, use the
designations as a political issue against his predecessor's party, or urge
Congress to pass legislation revoking or modifying the designations. The
incoming President might also use whatever discretion exists regarding
national monuments to shape the administration of the national monuments to
conform to his policies. This may be easier when a national monument is
designated very late in the prior President's term because it is unlikely that the
prior administration established institutions or practices that might have
created expectations for the management of the new monuments. For example,
some of the designations require the relevant agency to develop a
"management plan" within a specified period of time. This time period might
spill over into the successor's administration, giving the new President power
to influence the management of the monument.
A similar reality exists with regard to the President's use of the pardon
power. It does not appear that an incoming President has the power to revoke
or revise his predecessor's grants of pardons and clemencies. 73 An incoming
President could participate in an investigation of his predecessor's pardon
activity, and could encourage his Justice Department to criminally prosecute
anyone who is found to have violated the law in the pardon process. Some of
President Clinton's pardons did spark investigations,' 74 but President Bush's
172 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
173 As noted above, President Bush's Justice Department studied whether a pardon could

be revoked if some of the procedural steps in the pardon process were not complete when
the new President took office. See supra note 105. A new President might also be able to
tiniker with conditional pardons, for example, by ruling that the requisite conditions had not
been met. See Krent, supra note 105, at 1704 (suggesting that a new President might be
able to undo the conditions on a pardon). If the executive branch has to determine whether

or not a condition has been met, a new President could take a different view of the condition
from the President who granted the pardon, and might be able to influence the pardoned
criminal's actual enjoyment of the pardon. Interestingly, the House attempted to address the
whole pardon issue by proposing a constitutional amendment that would restrict the
President's pardon power at the end of a term. See H.R.J. Res. 22, 107th Cong. (2001); see
also Gregory C. Sisk, Suspending the Pardon Power During the Twilight of a Presidential

Term, 67 Mo. L. REV. 13, 26-27 (2002) (discussing the increased risk of abuse of the pardon
power that exists in the transitional period between administrations).
114 Both Congress and the incoming administration investigated some of President
Clinton's uses of the pardon power. See COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, JUSTICE
UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE, H.R. REP. No. 107-454

(2002); Karen Gullo, Ashcroft: Pardon Study Will Continue, AP ONLINE, Mar. 27, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 17988350 (discussing Ashcroft's decision to allow Mary Jo White, a
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administration asserted executive privilege, denying investigators access to
documents surrounding the pardons. 75 This executive privilege appears to
have been asserted to avoid setting the precedent of permitting access to
documents related to the President's use of the pardon power.
In sum, there are many tools that incoming Presidents can use to undermine
late-term actions by their predecessors. The effectiveness of the tools varies
depending on the particular action taken by the predecessors. In general, final
regulations issued by agencies have substantial durability, and the new
administration must replicate the notice and comment process to revise or
revoke them. Interpretive rules, policy statements, and other agency action for
which notice and comment is not required can be much more freely revised
and revoked. Executive orders are completely revisable and revocable by the
new President. Designations of national monuments are probably subject to
revision or revocation only via a statute passed by Congress. Presidential uses
of the pardon power are final and cannot be altered by an incoming
administration or by Congress. Even in those areas in which the new President
has power, political considerations may moderate the incoming President's
176
ability to alter the late-term actions of his predecessor.
III. POSSIBLE LEGAL REACTIONS AND REFORMS IN REACTION
TO "MIDNIGHT REGULATIONS"

The final question I address in this article, assuming that late-term
presidential and administrative action is viewed as problematic, is whether
effective legal reforms in reaction to "midnight regulation" can be crafted.
Reforms could take one of two general forms. Measures could be adopted to
make it harder for an outgoing President and his administration to act late in
the President's term, or measures could be adopted to make it easier for a new
administration to revise or revoke actions taken late in the outgoing President's
term. Before addressing possible reforms, however, it is useful to look at
whether the law currently places significant impediments on either the

federal prosecutor for the Southern District of New York, to continue and expand her study

of Clinton's last-minute pardons).
17' George Lardner, Jr., Secrecy Soughtfor Clinton Pardons,MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL,
Aug. 27, 2002, at 7A (reporting on the Bush administration's attempts to expand the scope
of executive privilege to cover officials anywhere in the government who are asked to
discuss or produce pardon records).
76 Possible reactions to late-term diplomatic activity are discussed above, supra notes

113-118 and accompanying text. As noted, "midnight" diplomatic activity is rare because a
lame-duck President ceases to be viewed as the authoritative voice of the United States in
international relations. If, however, an outgoing President does engage in diplomatic
activity, international law and other diplomatic considerations may make it more difficult
for an incoming President to repudiate the prior President's late-term output than in the
domestic sphere. See Combs, supra note 118, at 340-50 (discussing international law and
international relations implications of possible repudiation of Algiers Declarations entered
into on the last day of President Carter's presidency).
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President's direct involvement in late-term action
77
administration's reactions to that late-term action. 1

or the

incoming

PresidentialAdministration andAdministrative Law

A.

At the point of transition, either as an old administration is ending or a new
one is just beginning, the President appears to be more involved in managing
the executive branch than at most other times during the President's term.
Outgoing Presidents appear to lead the charge to get as much done as possible
in the administration's remaining time. Incoming Presidents tend to assert
leadership over the executive branch and, at the same time, attempt to deal
with the mountain of last-minute actions that outgoing Presidents sometimes
leave behind. As a result, the President's role in the management of the
administrative state may come under special legal and political scrutiny in
controversies arising out of action taken at or near the point of transition. It is
thus useful ask whether this enhanced role that the President plays in the
administrative state during this time period is in and of itself likely to raise
legal concerns.
As Dean Elena Kagan has so thoroughly and eloquently explained in her
recent article PresidentialAdministration,178 the President of the United States
increasingly has become the focus of the administrative state even beyond the
transition. Administrative action has become identified with presidential
action. As Dean Kagan explains, this has happened in two separate ways.
First, Presidents have worked hard to take more control of the administrative
state. This supervision has formal elements, such as centralized review,
executive orders and directives ordering administrators to take particular
action, and appointment and removal of administrators.' 79 It also has less
formal elements in which the President and his close advisors work with
agencies to shape agency action to fit within the President's overall policy
agenda. Second, Presidents (most notably President Clinton) have stagemanaged the administrative process to produce the appearance of control,
taking credit for the initiation and culmination of administrative action even

177

Professor Mendelson advocates the use of more transparent and regular procedures as

She sees, in the transition between
a way to avoid the pitfalls of "burrowing."
administrations, a potential for increased public attention to the work of the administration,
and thus the potential for enhancing the actualization of democratic values in the
administrative process. See Mendelson, supra note 8, at 660-62. Mendelson thus argues
against burrowing when it is done out of the public eye or in a way likely to obstruct the

proper functioning of the administrative process, for example, by allowing bureaucrats loyal
to the outgoing President to sabotage the work of the incoming administration. See id. at
662-63 (discussing the role that individual motivations play in personnel burrowing).
178 Kagan, supra note 63, at 2284-2303.
179 Id. at 2246 (asserting that the Presidency has taken a leading role in setting the
direction and influencing the outcome of the administrative process).
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when, in reality, the President was not very much involved. 180 Even if the
President did not have much to do with making the decision to take an
administrative action or with formulating its substance, the President
participates in the announcement of the plan and the announcement of the final
decision. This contributes to the President's appearance as an active leader in
administrative action throughout the executive branch.
Many of the legal issues that may arise in reaction to enhanced presidential
involvement in administration, whether at the point of transition or at other
times, boil down to questions regarding whether the unitary executive theory
represents the best understanding of the allocation of government power to the
executive branch. While Congress sometimes delegates power directly to the
President, more often it delegates power to a particular governmental
department, or to a particular agency, either within the executive branch or
outside of it. Presidents have, for the most part, respected the targeted
delegation of authority to entities other than the President, despite the
Constitution's arguable concentration of all executive power in the President.
For example, when President Clinton wanted to liberalize the "gag rule," he
did not take the action himself, but rather ordered HHS to engage in
rulemaking to revise the rule. The question arises as to whether the President's
involvement creates grounds for successfully challenging the resulting rule on
judicial review. For a believer in the unitary executive, the answer is an easy
"no," since under the unitary executive theory, the President has the absolute
right to control all activity within the executive branch. For a non-believer, the
answer is not so clear-cut. If the agency follows all procedural requirements
contained in the APA and any other applicable statutes and regulations, and if
the record before the agency is adequate to support the rule under the
applicable standard of review, then the only issue is whether the President's
influence is enough to taint the rule.
Imagine that, absent the President's influence, the agency would have
promulgated a different rule or no rule at all. A challenger could argue that the
President's involvement violates procedural requirements and that such
involvement is inconsistent with the delegation of authority to the agency. One
procedural argument might be that, as a result of presidential pressure, the
agency officials making the decision did not actually consider any comments
inconsistent with the President's wishes, thus violating the standard for openmindedness in rulemaking formulated by the D.C. Circuit. 18 1 Also, if the
President communicates his preferences outside the rulemaking process, a

I

Id. at 2277-99 (reviewing President Reagan's increased use of presidential

administration and discussing the formal techniques that President Clinton used to gain a

larger role in administration).
I Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding
that, when there is clear and convincing evidence showing that an agency member has an

"unalterably closed mind" in a matter critical to a rulemaking, that member can be
disqualified from the rulemaking proceeding).
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challenge might be based on the agency's consideration of comments or
documents from the President or his staff that were not placed on the record.
A more substantive challenge could be based on the locus of the authority
delegated by Congress to execute the statute involved. The argument would be
that while Congress delegated authority to a particular agency official, the
President or some member of his staff has, in effect if not as a formal matter,
exercised that authority.
It is unlikely that a court would invalidate a rule in response to any of these
arguments. The most promising challenge would be the claim that, in light of
presidential pressure, the decisionmaker lacked an open mind. While the D.C.
Circuit was not very clear about the basis for this standard, it is at least
arguable that the APA requires decisionmakers in rulemaking proceedings to
"consider[] the relevant matter presented" during the comment period. 8 2 A
decisionmaker who has made up his mind based on a presidential directive,
83
whether formal or informal, arguably does not fulfill this obligation.

Despite this argument, it does not appear that the "unalterably closed mind
standard" places a substantial constraint on agency rulemaking.

Most

fundamentally, the APA does not contain any explicit requirement of openmindedness on the part of decisionmakers in rulemaking proceedings. While it
may be that the APA implicitly requires all decisionmakers to "consider[] the
relevant matter presented,"' 8 4 given the Supreme Court's reluctance to add to
those procedures required by the APA, the Court is unlikely to countenance the
imposition of a strong requirement that is only implicit in the APA.
The case law bears out this prediction. There is no reported case in which a
decisionmaker has been disqualified in a rulemaking proceeding based on a
lack of open-mindedness. There have been cases in which courts have been
asked to invalidate a rule, or disqualify a decisionmaker in advance of the
promulgation of a rule, based on arguments that the decisionmaker's mind was
made up in advance of receiving the comments. In such cases, the courts recite
the possibility of disqualification or invalidation based on the "unalterably
closed mind" standard and then reject the argument while revealing very little
182 See

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000) (laying out the procedure
for rulemaking and requiring an agency to adopt a general statement of purpose after

"consideration of the relevant matter presented").
183 At least one court has stated that there is no statutory basis for disqualifying a
decisionmaker in a rulemaking. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1179 n.151
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that the required separation between an agency's investigative and
decisionmaking functions does not apply to informal rulemaking proceedings). If this is
correct, then it would appear that, absent a due process violation, application of this standard
would violate the Vermont Yankee doctrine, which prohibits courts from adding to the
procedural requirements contained in applicable statutes and rules. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 520 (1978) (holding that the
formulation of procedural requirements for rulemaking beyond those explicitly required by
the APA should be left to the discretion of federal agencies).
184 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
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about what set of facts might actually violate the rule. 85 It thus seems that the
"unalterably closed mind" standard lacks real bite.
In addition to the doubtful legality of judicial imposition of the "unalterably
closed mind" standard, the courts have recognized that application of the
standard could conflict with the realities of the political aspects of the
administrative process. Agency heads are often chosen, at least in part, based
on their previously expressed policy commitments. They make speeches,
publish articles, and engage in other forms of communication in which they
advocate for government action to deal with particular problems in particular
ways. Courts have resisted efforts to disqualify politicians such as these from
participating in rulemaking proceedings because disqualification would require
a significant transformation in the administrative process. 186 If such a rule
were adopted, Presidents would be, at a minimum, seriously hampered in their
ability to appoint activists to important agency positions.
Courts might also be reluctant to cast doubt on the legality of rules in other
situations in which agencies promulgate rules under external compulsion. For
example, agencies sometimes engage in rulemaking under judicial compulsion
or at least the threat of judicial compulsion, as when a lawsuit against an
agency is settled with an agreement to promulgate legally required rules. 187
Under the influence of a court decree, an agency may issue a rule that deviates
185 See, e.g., C&W Fish Co. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 1556, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (determining
that a fish wholesaler's challenge to an amendment to the fishery management plan failed to
make a clear and convincing showing that the Assistant Administrator for Fisheries of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration had an unalterably closed mind in
adopting the ban, even though there was evidence of his earlier advocacy of the ban and his
policy view favoring the ban); Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, 627 F.2d at 1152 (reversing the
lower court's decision to prohibit the Chairman of the FTC from participating in a pending
rulemaking proceeding concerning children's advertising because the plaintiffs could not
make a clear and convincing showing that the chairman had an unalterably closed mind).
186 See, e.g., C&W Fish Co., 931 F.2d at 1564 (finding that neither Fox's earlier
advocacy nor his publicly expressed policy views demonstrated an unalterably closed mind
that would disqualify him as an impartial decisionmaker); Ass 'n of Nat'l Advertisers, 627
F.2d at 1174 (rejecting a formulation of the disqualification standard that impinges on the
political process by disallowing administrators to state policy views before participating in a
rulemaking proceeding); Colao v. County Council of Prince George's County, 675 A.2d
148, 166 (Md. App. 1996) (stating that "bias or prejudice of an agency decisionmaker
related to issues of law or policy are not disqualifying").
187 Cf Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1401 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (holding that the "Tulloch Rule," which regulates dredging operations and was
promulgated based on the settlement of claims against the EPA, was invalid as beyond the
EPA's powers). In United Steelworkers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 729 (3d Cir.
1985), the court virtually required OSHA to extend the application of a previously
promulgated rule to industries not covered by the original rule. This rule was later upheld
against a challenge, where the challenger argued that the rule was invalid because it had
been rejected by OMB. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Pendergrass, 855 F.2d 108, 109
(3d Cir. 1988), aff'dsub nom. Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 26 (1990).
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from actual administrative preferences. One could argue that the agency did
not seriously consider comments that were contrary to the push or pull of the
external force such as the judicial order. Of course, if a court finds that an
agency is legally required to issue a particular rule (or at least issue a rule in a
legally-prescribed range) then the agency should not be faulted for not
considering comments urging the agency to violate its legal duties. However,
things are rarely so clear-cut, and agencies could be credibly charged with
failing to properly consider comments when they issue rules under external
compulsion. Courts are unlikely to accept these arguments, which in effect
would hamper courts' ability to enforce their judgments regarding proper
administrative conduct.
A challenge based on presidential communication with agency officials "off
the record" is also unlikely to succeed. Whether ex parte comments are
prohibited in rulemaking proceedings is uncertain. The APA contains no such
prohibition, except in "formal" proceedings, and neither do the majority of
particular agency statutes. Given this lack of statutory authority, it is doubtful
that the courts have the authority to ban ex parte comments in rulemaking.
There are creative arguments based on the fairness of the rulemaking process,
the right to participate, and the agency's obligation to consider only material
that is on the record. However, arguments of this form may ultimately conflict
with the Vermont Yankee rule, which, as noted above, prohibits courts from
adding procedural requirements beyond those contained in applicable statutes
and rules.' 8 8 Efforts to restrict the President or his close aides from
communicating "off the record" with agency officials also implicate separation
of powers concerns. 89
There are two situations in which courts might, on their own, impose a rule
requiring communications from the President to be made on the record. The
first is when an agency admits that its rule is based on a communication from
the President. The second is when the President intervenes in a judicial or
quasi-judicial procedure in which the rights and duties of particular individuals
are being decided. In the usual rulemaking procedure, however, as long as the
public record adequately supports the rule, it is unlikely that "off the record"
presidential communications would lead a court to invalidate the rule.
A more substantive claim is that presidential involvement in the rulemaking
illegally fails to respect the locus of Congress's delegation of administrative
authority. This claim is a bit trickier but still unlikely to result in the
invalidation of any rule. This is mainly because Presidents are likely to respect
the form of congressional delegation even as they work to undercut it by
ordering or informally pressuring agencies to act.
Going back to the

'

Vt.

Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. 519; see supra note 183 and

accompanying text.
181

See generally Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (warning that,

where the President is involved in communications with executive branch officials, courts
should be cautious about mandating disclosure so as to not offend Article II considerations).
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previously noted example of the gag rule, President Clinton did not himself
suspend the operation of the gag rule, issue a notice of proposed rulemaking, or
adopt the final rule amending the gag rule. Rather, he ordered HHS to suspend
it and to propose and consider new rules. The actual suspension and
rulemaking were conducted by the Secretary of HHS within the terms of
Congress's delegation.
The only problematic element of this chain of events is the President's
initial order to suspend the gag rule and promulgate new rules. The President's
involvement should probably be ignored because all of the required legal steps
were taken by the appropriate officials in the administrative chain of
command. The Secretary of HHS was free to ignore the President's order, in
which case the President would have had to decide whether to replace the
Secretary. Of course, this was very unlikely in the first week of a new
administration. Given the political importance of the abortion issue, it is
unlikely that the President-elect was unaware of his nominee's views on the
gag rule. Because the Secretary would likely have moved on the gag rule even
without a formal order from the President, the President's involvement should
be treated as part of the public relations aspect of presidential administration.
Given the Democratic Party's views on abortion rights, the new administration
was very likely to return to a less-restrictive gag rule, and President Clinton
took the opportunity to showcase his views on abortion by taking part in the
alteration process.
The gag rule example is not unique in its salient respects, at least insofar as
executive branch agencies are concerned. Presidents are unlikely to formally
assume the roles in the administrative process assigned by Congress to
particular agency officials. The only reason a President would do so is to
provoke a confrontation, perhaps hoping that the separation of powers issues
involved would be resolved in favor of complete presidential control over the
administrative process. Given the President's appointment and removal power
over officials within the executive branch, Presidents are unlikely to find it
necessary to formally seize power over administrative matters that Congress
has delegated to a particular official.
Thus, it seems that presidential
involvement in efforts to accomplish more at the last minute or to undo a prior
administration's last minute actions are unlikely to raise significant special
legal concerns.
B.

Reforms Directed at OutgoingPresidents

Assuming that existing law does not provide an effective set of tools
directed at "midnight regulations," reforms might be adopted to hinder the
ability of outgoing Presidents to act. It is easy to imagine this sort of reform.
Congress could amend the APA to prohibit the publication of final rules,
interpretive rules, notices of proposed rulemakings, or other important
documents for some specific period of time at the end of a presidential term.
Congress might statutorily prohibit the President from creating any new
commissions or advisory committees for some period of time before the end of
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a term. Congress could amend the Antiquities Act to prohibit designations of
national monuments for a certain period of time before the end of the
President's term. A constitutional amendment could restrict the President's
pardon power in the lame-duck period. Instead of prohibitions, Congress
might require that late-term action be held to a higher standard of justification,
requiring, for example, that any rules issued within ninety days of the end of
the term be accompanied by a finding that certain exigencies prevent waiting
until the new administration takes office. While these reforms and others are
possible, there are a variety of reasons why I do not think they are as attractive
as reforms aimed at making it easier for the new President to get out from
under "midnight regulations."
In general, it may be very difficult to differentiate between those actions
taken late in a term that are desirable and those that are undesirable. As
discussed above, it is often unclear why a particular action was taken in the
waning days of an administration. As we have seen, sometimes late-term
action is the result of waiting so that the political heat does not matter,
sometimes it is due to hurrying to finish more work in the waning days of
power, and sometimes it is the result of external delay, often attributable to
Congress. When late-term action is the result of congressional obstruction,
restricting the executive, for example by forbidding new regulations for some
period before Inauguration Day, would shift power to Congress by making it
easier for Congress to prevent executive action.
Even in cases in which late-term actions raise substantial concerns, it may
not be desirable to place restrictions on presidential action. An outgoing
President might wait until late in the term to take important action due to fear
of that action's political consequences. While this waiting may be problematic
in many circumstances, in other situations it may be the only way a President is
able to take important, socially desirable action. As noted above, perhaps only
in the period after the election, just prior to the end of the President's term, is
the President able to rise above narrow interests and act out of a broader notion
of social good. With regard to late-term action that appears to be an
administration hurrying to do more late in its term, deadlines can inspire good
work, and thus restrictions run the risk of preventing much good in the name of
preventing a little bad.
Restrictions on executive power may also cripple the government by
creating a power vacuum that no one could fill. Presidents often act in
emergencies or near-emergencies, and it is important not to overly restrict the
President's ability to react to exigencies when quick and decisive action is in
the national interest. Even if restrictions in reforms contained exceptions for
emergencies, uncertainty over whether a particular situation meets the
requirements for an exception, along with other factors, might overly restrict
an outgoing administration's ability to take desirable action.
It might be, however, that on balance some restrictions would be desirable.
For example, with regard to national monument designations under the
Antiquities Act, perhaps a ninety day notice and comment process should be
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instituted so that the President must at least serve notice of what is being
considered before the very end of the term. It is difficult to imagine a situation
in which a designation must be made immediately to resolve an emergency.
While such designations are important and may be controversial, their
importance does not appear to rise to the level that would make it desirable for
the President to be able to avoid the political costs of making them. 90 There
may be other examples in which a requirement of some notice before the
November election would ameliorate some of the problems associated with
"midnight regulations."
Another problem is that there are some presidential powers that might be
very difficult to restrict. First and most fundamentally, Congress may simply
lack the power to restrict the President's exercise of those powers enumerated
in Article II of the Constitution or those powers considered inherently part of
the executive power. An example of a power in the former category is the
pardon power. The Constitution grants the President the pardon power, and
any effort by Congress to restrict it would be constitutionally suspect. 19 As
we have seen with regard to the Clinton administration's use of the pardon
power, although an incoming administration might want to investigate
criminality on the part of those involved in the prior administration's pardon
process, the new administration may not want to release executive branch
documents to outside investigators for fear that its own pardon process might
be subjected to a similar investigation later. Among those powers that could
be viewed as part of the executive power might be the President's power to
conduct foreign relations. Although some aspects of this power (such as the
power to receive ambassadors) are enumerated in the Constitution, other
aspects of this power are not, but any effort to restrict the exercise of inherent
executive power might raise constitutional questions.

may be wrong about this. Perhaps the Antiquities Act was designed to allow
unilateral presidential action to avoid the political mess that could occur if notice and
comment procedures were employed. Nothing in the legislative history, however, suggests
anything more than a desire to protect archaeological and scientific sites, and from the
beginning there has been an outcry that Presidents have gone far beyond the purposes of the
Act in designating monuments. See Klein, supra note 80, at 1343-44 (stating that
designations have been unsuccessfully challenged on the grounds that Presidents have
exceeded their authority under the Act by preserving much more land than Congress
intended); see also Squillace, supra note 80, at 534-36.
191 There was some discussion of restricting the President's pardon power after President
Clinton's grant of clemency to the members of FALN. See supra text accompanying notes
109-111. Any significant restriction might require a constitutional amendment, like that
190 1

which was proposed in reaction to President Clinton's pardons. See H.R.J. Res. 22, 107th

Cong. (2001) (suggesting that, with exceptions, the power to grant pardons should not be
exercised between October 1st of a year in which a Presidential election occurs and January
21st of the following year).
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Reforms Aimed at Incoming Administrations

Reforms aimed at making it easier for an incoming administration to deal
with "midnight regulations" may be more workable for a variety of reasons.
The first reason is simply that the incoming administration can readily identify
which late-term actions by the prior administration are problematic and focus
on those matters. This should be more efficient than potentially costly broadbased reforms directed at everything an administration might be doing near the
end of the term. This proposition is in some tension with the notion that one
problem with "midnight regulation" is that it puts the incoming administration
to the task of sorting through and cleaning up everything that the prior
administration did late in its term. If there were an easy way to force outgoing
administrations to behave better, it might be preferable to putting the onus on
the incoming administration. If, however, the reforms discussed below give
the incoming administration more effective tools with which to deal with
"midnight regulation," perhaps the incentive for outgoing administrations to
engage in "midnight regulation" will be reduced enough to lessen the incoming
administration's need to use those tools.
In thinking about possible reforms to facilitate the incoming administration
in dealing with the late-term actions of the prior administration, we need to
conclude, or at least assume, that for some reason the new administration ought
to have the power to do so. If it turns out that there is nothing really wrong
with "midnight regulation," then there is obviously no need for reform.
Proceeding on the assumption that "midnight regulation" is problematic, what
possible reforms might ameliorate or eliminate some of the negative
consequences of the "midnight regulation" phenomenon?
One possible reform, realizable either through judicial decision or by an
amendment to the APA, is to dispense with the notice and comment
requirement for agencies when they rescind or amend final rules that have yet
to actually become effective. 192 This would allow an incoming administration
to deal with one of the most egregious examples of "midnight regulation," a
rule that is promulgated by the prior administration but does not take effect
until after the new administration is already in office. Note that this reform
would not be confined to the period of transition, but rather would allow
agencies to freely reconsider rules after promulgation for reasons unrelated to
the "midnight regulation" problem. The power is less likely to be used by an
administration on its own rules, but it could happen in instances where a rule
provokes a negative reaction greater than the agency expected, or perhaps
where the President or a department head was unaware of the rule or all of its
implications until it was promulgated and then finds it unacceptable in whole
or in part.
There are a few complications that would have to be worked out to grant an
agency the power to rescind regulations up to their effective dates. One
192See Levin, supra note 158, at 765 (arguing that agencies may reconsider recently

promulgated rules without notice and comment).
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problem is that the effective date of some rules might be years away, which
would give an agency unilateral power to rescind or revise rules for a long
period of time. Under current law, a rule is generally considered "final" upon
promulgation even though it may not yet have become effective. 193 Agencies
often announce new standards long before they take effect in order to give
affected interests time to meet the standard.
For example, the Carter
administration's rule requiring airbags in new automobiles was issued in 1977
with a stated effective date of September 1, 1981, when the first airbags would
actually be required.' 94 The stated effective date is a misnomer, since the rule
established a legally binding schedule immediately upon promulgation, with a
minimum thirty day delay as required by the APA. 95 In cases such as this, an
agency should not have the power to rescind or revise the rule for the entire
period before it becomes effective. Rather, it should only be able to do so for a
brief period, and if no effective date in the reasonably near future is specified,
an arbitrary cutoff for the rescission power, perhaps ninety days after
publication, could be adopted. 196 The airbags rule had, as a practical matter,
become final in the sense that it was on the books (in the Code of Federal
Regulations) even though it had not yet required manufacturers to equip cars
with airbags. Many rules share this attribute, becoming final long before
compliance is expected. 197 It is unclear whether an agency has the power to
"I See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 802-03 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (ruling
that EPA's deferral of a promulgated permit process amounted to a suspension of a
regulation without notice or comment in violation of the APA); Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 753 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that the EPA, which violated the
provisions of the APA by indefinitely postponing the effective date of final amendments to
regulations, was required to reinstate all amendments to their originally designated effective
dates); Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d
425, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that the fact that the House of Representatives
disapproved of a rule issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission did not make
the rule any less final).
14 Modified Standard 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1978).
'95 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2000) (requiring the
publication of a rule to be made not less than thirty days before its effective date).
196 Without a statute specifying a period of easy rescission or revision, it may be that the
only time period a court could adopt in the absence of an effective date in the reasonably
near future would be the thirty days specified in the APA as the minimum period between
publication of a rule and its effective date. See id. This would give the President power
over the most egregious cases of "midnight regulation," but would not address
administrative action late in the outgoing President's term but before approximately
December 20th of the last year of the President's term. For major rules, perhaps the sixty
day period specified in the Congressional Review Act might be used. See 5 U.S.C. §
801(a)(3) (stating that no major rule shall take effect sooner than sixty days after it is
submitted to Congress for review).
97 For example, the effective date of the final rule promulgated in the last week of
President Clinton's administration entitled Energy Conservation Programfor Consumer
Products; Energy Conservation Standardsfor Water Heaters is January 20, 2004. Energy
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pull back, rescind, or amend regulations based on the original rulemaking
record in the period between the publication of the rule and its effective date.
Another set of issues involves judicial review of the rescission or revision of
a rule in the pre-effective date period. The Airbags Case stands for the
proposition that, once a rule has become final, rescission or amendment is
98
subject to review under the same standard as a newly promulgated rule.'
Putting aside the fact of transition in administrations, this proposition still
raises the interesting question of what substantive standard of review applies
when an agency promulgates a rule and then changes its mind before the rule
has gone into effect. For example, assume that an agency publishes a notice of
proposed rulemaking, receives comments, and then issues a final rule to take
effect sixty days after publication. Then, thirty days later, the agency decides
for some reason not to go forward, or to make changes to the rule, and issues a
notice rescinding or amending the published, but not yet effective, final rule.
Assume further that the rulemaking record provides adequate support for the
original rule (so the rule would have been upheld on judicial review) and also
for the rule as amended or for an agency decision not to go forward with the
proposed rule at all.
Should review be available (and if so on what standard) if at the time of
rescission or amendment the rule rescinded or amended had not yet reached its
effective date? In my view, review should not focus on the fact of rescission
or revision, but rather should focus on the agency's ultimate decision. In a
case where a rule is rescinded, review should be available if an agency
decision not to promulgate a rule in the first place would have been
reviewable.' 99 Note that in neither case is this review of agency inaction:
rather, it is review of an agency decision, after notice and comment, to refrain
from issuing a rule. The decision would be judged on the record created in the
original notice and comment process.2 00 Courts have reviewed decisions not to

Conservation Program for Consumer Products; Energy Conservation Standards for Water
Heaters, 66 Fed. Reg. 4474 (Jan. 17, 2001) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430).
198 Airbags Case, 463 U.S. 29,41 (1983).
199I recognize that this is probably contrary to current law under which rules are
considered final upon promulgation even if they have not yet gone into effect. See Envtl.
Def. Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (ruling that EPA's deferral of a
promulgated permit process amounted to a suspension of a regulation without notice or
comment in violation of the APA); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752
(3d Cir. 1982) (holding that the EPA, which violated the provisions of the APA by
indefinitely postponing the effective date of final amendments to regulations, was required
to reinstate all amendments to their originally designated effective dates); Consumer Energy
Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d at 446 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(stating that the fact that the House of Representatives disapproved of a rule issued by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission did not make the rule any less final).
200 One interesting suggestion, made by my colleague Jay Wexler, is that the incoming
President, through his transition office, could monitor the rulemaking process conducted by
the outgoing administration and submit comments urging his predecessor not to take actions
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promulgate any rule after a notice and comment process under a very
deferential standard, but have rejected arguments that such decisions are not
reviewable at all. 20 1 In the case of a revision, the revised rule should be
reviewed based on the record created in the notice and comment process. In
both cases the promulgation of the initial rule should be irrelevant on judicial
review so that the power to rescind or revise rules shortly after promulgation is
20 2
not overly restricted.
Ignoring the original rule on judicial review of a rescission or revision may
be contrary to the Airbags Case.20 3 In that case, the Supreme Court held that,
absent contrary statutory provisions, judicial review of the rescission of a rule
should be conducted under the same standard as judicial review of the issuance
of a rule. 2 04 Nothing in the Court's decision, however, would prevent
Congress from statutorily providing for a different standard, either generally or
applicable only to rescissions and revisions that occur shortly after
promulgation. 20 5 Further, the Airbags Case involved a rescission that was
ordered almost four years after the initial rule was issued. It is unclear whether
the courts would or should treat a rescission or revision shortly after issuance
the same. It may be that, even without an amendment to the APA, agencies
already have the power to revise or rescind regulations for a short time after
they are issued, with judicial review focusing on the final product and ignoring
revision or rescission.
This whole discussion points toward ignoring existing rules generally on
judicial review of rules that are contrary to a prior administration's rules under
the same statute and on the same subject. Focusing only on the "midnight
regulation" problem, a new administration might argue that it should be able to

that are either inconsistent with the views of the incoming administration or that would
unduly hamper the incoming administration's performance. If the outgoing administration
nevertheless issued regulations inconsistent with the comments submitted by the new
administration, those comments would be part of the rulemaking record and might help
convince a court to overturn regulations promulgated at the last minute by the previous
administration. This would be helpful but is not a complete cure for "midnight regulation,"
assuming it is viewed as a problem.
20 See Weight Watchers lnt'l, Inc. v. RTC, 47 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 1995) (denial of
petition for rulemaking is final agency action subject to judicial review).
202 See Levin, supra note 158, at 765 (suggesting that agencies may reconsider rules they
have recently promulgated without notice and comment). But see Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 474 (1951) (holding that, when an agency overrules an initial
decision by an Administrative Law Judge ("AL"), the ALJ's decision is part of the record

and, on judicial review, should be considered as evidence against the agency's decision).
203 463 U.S. 29.
204 Id. at

41.
The decision in the Airbags Case was based on the Court's reading of the statute
governing the administrative decision in that case, which "equates orders 'revoking' and
'establishing' safety standards." Id. at 30. Nothing in the Court's opinion suggests that
Congress could not specify a different standard for revocations.
205
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freely rescind rules issued in the last few months of the prior administration,
especially rules that had not yet gone into effect at the time of the transition,
because the lateness of the promulgation of the "midnight regulations" means
that they are unlikely to be the product of a genuine policy judgment. Instead,
they are likely to be motivated by politics, and a desire to make life difficult
for the new administration without much hope of actually affecting policy.
The problem lies in the potential difficulties of distinguishing between
"midnight regulations" and other rules. Even regulations issued at the very end
of an administration usually have had a relatively long period of incubation,
with at least several months of internal review and notice and comment, and
sometimes there are very good reasons behind the lateness of the prior
administration's rules.
It might be worthwhile to consider adjusting standards of judicial review
generally to deal with the problem of "midnight regulations" and, more
importantly, to take better account of the role that policy plays in the
administrative process. Perhaps the Airbags Case Court was wrong in its
choice of the prior regulatory regime as the baseline for evaluating new rules.
There are good arguments in favor of using the statute as the only baseline and
determining the validity of a rule without regard to rules promulgated by prior
administrations.
When there is little or no indication that Congress intended for regulations
to be made largely or purely on technical grounds, policy plays a larger role in
an administration's decisionmaking on regulations. 20 6 Consider once again the
varying rules on abortion counseling in federally funded family planning
clinics. The differences among the various administrations' rules were much
less about a search for statutory meaning or maximization of social welfare
than about political disagreement on abortion rights. When the Reagan
206 Professor Charles Koch has recently defined policymaking as "those government
decisions that promote and protect societal values." Charles H. Koch, Jr., JudicialReview
of Administrative Policymaking, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375, 378 (2002) (distinguishing
between agency policy decisions and decisions involving agency statutory interpretation).
He urges that standards of judicial review should reflect the degree to which an agency has
exercised delegated policymaking power, and that the Chevron standard of review should
not be used in such cases. See id. at 392-95. The proper standard of judicial review of
agency policymaking, according to Professor Koch, is the abuse of discretion or arbitrary
and capricious test under which the Court reviewed the rescission in the Airbags Case. Id.
at 393-94, 395.
My argument is similar to Professor Koch's, although I find that where an agency
decision is heavily laden with policy considerations, the "arbitrary, capricious or abuse of
discretion" standard should be somewhat more deferential than the standard applied in the
Airbags Case. 463 U.S. at 41-44 (explaining that, under an "arbitrary, capricious or abuse
of discretion" standard, an agency must "articulate a satisfactory explanation for its actions
including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,"' but
clarifying that a reviewing court can "'uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the
agency's path may reasonably be determined' (citations omitted)).
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administration adopted what became known as the gag rule, it was reversing
the prior interpretation of the statute as embodied in rules adopted by the
Carter administration. The Supreme Court upheld the gag rule on judicial
review, holding that the Reagan administration had offered sufficient reasons
for reversing the prior interpretation:
We find that the Secretary amply justified his change of interpretation
with a "reasoned analysis." The Secretary explained that the regulations
are a result of his determination, in the wake of the critical reports of the
General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Office of the Inspector
General (OIG), that prior policy failed to implement properly the statute
and that it was necessary to provide "'clear and operational guidance' to
grantees about how to preserve the distinction between Title X programs
and abortion as a method of family planning." He also determined that
the new regulations are more in keeping with the original intent of the
statute, are justified by client experience under the prior policy, and are
supported by a shift in attitude against the "elimination of unborn children
by abortion." We believe that these justifications are sufficient to support
the Secretary's revised approach. Having concluded that the plain
language and legislative history are ambiguous as to Congress' intent in
enacting Title X, we must
defer to the Secretary's permissible
20 7
construction of the statute.
Under this analysis, the prior administration's interpretation is relatively
unimportant to the determination of whether to approve the new rules.
Although the Court cites the Airbags Case's requirement that changes in rules
be supported by "reasoned analysis," and argues that the new rules will
improve administration of the program, most of the reasons for change had
more to do with fidelity to the statute and current policy than with improving
the workability of the rule. The two most important reasons offered by the
Court are better consistency with the "original intent of the statute" and "a shift
in attitude against the 'elimination of unborn children by abortion.' 20 8 The
"shift in attitude" is between administrations. 20 9 'There is no suggestion that
the Reagan administration was relying on public opinion research.
The gag rule case may be an easy one for allowing revision because it is a
pure question of statutory interpretation. Requiring a high level of justification
for alterations in administrative statutory construction may be inconsistent with
the Chevron doctrine's strong emphasis on administrative power to construe
ambiguous statutes.2 10 What about situations in which technical considerations
207 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1992) (citations omitted).
208 Id. (citing Airbags Case, 463 U.S. at 42).

209

Airbags Case, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part) ("A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a

perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of
its programs and regulations.").
211 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 862 (1984)
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have greater relevance? For example, technical factors are likely to be very
important to any administration's decision of what sort of automobile safety
mechanisms to require. Does this mean that the Court was correct in the
Airbags Case to require a substantially higher degree of justification for
rescinding the airbag requirement, since the issue was more technical than the
simple question of statutory interpretation involving the gag rule?
I am not so sure that the distinction between the two kinds of cases holds up.
Of course, in a rule involving the imposition of safety requirements for the
manufacture or operation of a machine like an automobile, more technical
factors will be present than in a case involving the meaning of an enforcement
provision like the gag rule. But Chevron itself, even though it involved
controversial policy matters, was characterized by the Court as a pure case of
statutory construction, 2 11 and it also involved technical questions concerning
the best way to reduce air pollution. Even administrative decisions that
involve some technical questions can be dominated by political considerations
such as the administration's taste for regulation, preference for market
solutions, views on whether states should be the primary regulators, and
preference for freedom as opposed to paternalism.
In my view, there are strong arguments in favor of ignoring prior regulatory
action in many situations in which an administration might move to reverse or
modify its predecessor's rules. Consider what might have happened had the
administrative actions at issue in the Airbags Case come in the reverse order.
Suppose the Reagan administration had received a petition to require airbags in
automobiles, had conducted a rulemaking on the subject, and had decided not
to require airbags. The rulemaking record would very likely contain credible
comments on both sides. Automobile manufacturers would likely have
submitted credible information showing that airbags were very expensive, that
they might be dangerous in some circumstances, that they were an unproven
technology, that they would be very difficult to install (especially in small
cars), and that the market will take care of people's demand for safer cars.
Comments from the other side would have contained credible information
pointing against these contentions. The Reagan administration would have had
ample justification in the record for denying the petition, and the denial would
likely have been upheld on judicial review under the very deferential standard
applied to decisions not to regulate. The administration might have written an
explanation for its denial, finding the information submitted against the
requirement more trustworthy than the information submitted by the other side,
but the decision would certainly have been informed by the administration's
general distaste for regulation and preference for market decisions.

(rejecting the argument that changes in statutory interpretation are not entitled to deference);
accordRust, 500 U.S. at 186-87.
211 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 840 (stating that the question before the Court was
whether the EPA's plant-wide definition was a reasonable construction of the statutory term
"stationary source").
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Now suppose a subsequent administration comes into office with a greater
appetite for regulation, less trust in market solutions, and more concern for
automobile safety. If this subsequent administration conducts a new rulemaking and assembles a record that, absent the Reagan administration's prior
rule, would justify the imposition of a rule requiring airbags, the fact that the
Reagan administration had already declined to make such a rule on a very
similar record should have little if any bearing on the propriety of the new rule.
Going back to the actual sequence of events, the Carter administration
undoubtedly received plenty of comments opposing the imposition of its
airbags requirement. If the original record would have supported a decision
either way, it does not make sense to create, with the first administration's
politically motivated decision, a barrier against change.
The problem of "midnight regulations" would be ameliorated if the
standards for judicial review took greater account of pure political-type policy
considerations.
A new administration sifting through what the prior
administration left behind could take a fresh look at the rulemaking record in a
recently minted rule and rescind or revise the rule based on its differing policy
views, much as the Reagan administration did with regard to both the gag rule
and the airbags rule. While the new administration might be required to
conduct a new notice and comment rulemaking to make its changes, there are
good arguments that it should not have to meet a higher level of justification
than if no action had been taken by a prior administration.
In some areas, it may be very difficult to enact reforms aimed at making it
easier for a new administration to overcome actions taken at the end of its
predecessor's term.
If the President presents a treaty to the Senate or
nominates a judge at the very end of his term, the treaty will go into effect or
the judge will assume office upon Senate approval. 2 12 (The new President may
212 Late term judgeships, called "midnight judgeships," were at issue in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Although the Court ultimately held it was without

jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary of State to issue Marbury
his commission, the Court commented on the finality of the appointment actions taken at the
end of the prior President's term:
The power of nominating to the senate, and the power of appointing the person
nominated, are political powers, to be exercised by the president according to his own
discretion. When he has made an appointment, he has exercised his whole power, and
his discretion has been completely applied to the case. If by law the officer be
removable at the will of the president, then a new appointment may be immediately
made, and the rights of the officer are terminated. But as a fact which has existed
cannot be made never to have existed, the appointment cannot be annihilated; and,
consequently, if the officer is by law not removable at the will of the president, the
rights he has acquired are protected by the law, and are not resumable by the president.
They cannot be extinguished by executive authority, and he has the privilege of

asserting them in like manner as if they had been derived from any other source.
The question, whether a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, and must be
tried by the judicial authority. If, for example, Mr. Marbury had taken the oaths of a
magistrate, and proceeded to act as one, in consequence of which a suit had been
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be able to revoke or renounce a treaty, but the fact of transition is irrelevant to
that power or process.) Once the Senate approves, the process is over and the
new President cannot simply undo it. The same holds true for legislation
presented to the President at the very end of his term-once he signs it or
vetoes it, the process is over and the new President cannot unilaterally change
it. The fact that these actions require the cooperation of the Senate or Congress
as a whole provides a safeguard against late-term presidential action, but if
both the Senate leadership and the presidency are changing parties as a result
of an election, there may be "midnight judgeships, statutes and treaties" as well
'213
as "midnight regulations.
CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of "midnight regulation" at the end of every President's term
appears to be a fact of life, especially when a new President of a different party
is elected. In fact, because it appears that an outgoing administration realizes
that some of its late-term actions have no hope of actually being carried into
fruition, some late-term action may be merely symbolic at best, or at worst
designed to make life difficult for the incoming administration, including the
infliction of political costs. Late-term administrative action takes many forms,
some of which are easy for the new President to deal with and some of which
are more difficult. Because of the high volume of late-term regulatory action,
new administrations feel compelled to devote substantial time and effort to
sorting through the last minute actions of their predecessors. In a significant
number of cases, the new administration attempts to undo late-term actions
taken by the previous administration. Because the incumbent President retains
all of the powers of the presidency until the transition actually occurs, it may
be difficult to restrict an outgoing administration's ability to engage in
"midnight regulation." It may be more feasible to make it easier for an
incoming administration to undo actions taken late in the previous
administration's term. Whether this is desirable depends on whether "midnight
regulation" is seen as improper behavior on the way out of office, or as
desirable behavior on the part of an administration finally freed from the
political constraints that operate when reelection and other political needs still
exist. The one thing that seems certain is that the "midnight regulation"
instituted against him, in which his defence had depended on his being a magistrate, the
validity of his appointment must have been determined by judicial authority.
So, if he conceives, that by virtue of his appointment, he has a legal right either to the
commission which has been made out for him, or to a copy of that commission, it is
equally a question examinable in a court, and the decision of the court upon it must
depend on the opinion entertained of his appointment.

Id.
at 167.
213 The Senate's rules mean that the outgoing President's party, if it were inclined to

cooperate with the President and approve last-minute appointments, would need a
substantial majority in the Senate to push through judgeships at the last moment. See supra
note 10 (noting that debate in the Senate may be ended only by a three-fifths majority vote).
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